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We investigate to what extent high net replacement rates between non-work and work 
household income may distort work incentives. Using a microsimulation model, we find that 
net replacement rates are particularly high for households with a working partner and 
children. While net replacement rates decreased moderately between 1996 and 2006 as wages 
rose faster than social benefits, the incidence of unemployment traps remains high. In 
particular, about a third of all employed individuals have a low incentive to avoid short spells 
of unemployment with the unemployment benefits provided, while unemployment traps are 
also widespread among the unemployed. The incidence of unemployment traps increased 
further in 2007 despite a reform of benefits. In particular, housing benefit, which was 
overhauled to reflect housing costs, increases net replacement rates, distorting work 
incentives particularly among households with children. In addition, the rise in parental 
allowance may lock eligible individuals in non-employment, increasing the loss of human 
capital among non-working parents. This is particularly important for single parents, who 
face the highest specific unemployment rate, and also long unemployment spells among all 
household types. While the link between net replacement rates and labour market stocks and 
flows is not straightforward across household types, further research should focus on the 
labour market behaviour of particular household types. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
We investigate to what extent Czech taxes and benefits affect employment and unemployment 
and labour market flows through work incentives. We derive tax-benefit equations for 1996 and 
2006 and, using these equations, we analyse for specific household types the net replacement rates 
between the net household income when a person stays at home and the net household income 
when the person works. 
We find high net replacement rates in 1996 for households with children and a working partner, 
particularly for transitions between employment and short-term unemployment. In general, the 
replacement rates decreased moderately until 2006 primarily because wages rose faster than social 
benefits, but the incidence of high replacement rates remains high. In particular, about a third of 
all employed individuals have a low incentive to avoid short spells of unemployment with the 
unemployment benefits provided, while unemployment traps are also widespread among the 
unemployed. 
The incidence of unemployment traps increased further in 2007 despite a reform of benefits. The 
comparison of budget constraints reveals that the net household income increased for some 
household types in 2007 relative to 2006. In particular, while social assistance is in general less 
generous, the reform gives preferential treatment to households with some work income by 
increasing the amount of social assistance benefits. This further increases the incidence of 
unemployment traps among less well-off households with a working partner. We also find that the 
housing benefit scheme, which was overhauled to reflect housing costs, increases net replacement 
rates, distorting work incentives, particularly among households with children. Finally, parental 
allowance was substantially increased in 2007. As this benefit is not means-tested, it raises the 
income of all households with at least one child younger than 4, but less well off households lose 
other means-tested benefits. The upsurge in household income may lock eligible individuals into 
non-employment, increasing the loss of human capital among non-working parents. This is 
particularly important for single parents, who face the highest specific unemployment rate, and 
also long unemployment spells among all household types. 
Further changes to taxes and benefits are desirable in order to diminish the distortions of non-
work income on work incentives and to ensure fiscal sustainability. Reform proposals should be 
‘ex-ante’ examined with regard to how they may affect the labour market behaviour of particular 
population groups and also with regard to their budgetary impact. Further research should analyse 
particularly how housing benefit distorts work incentives in regions, as the benefit is linked to 
local costs of living. 
 Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   3 
 
                                                          
1. Introduction 
Labour market institutions, particularly welfare benefits, have been identified as contributing to 
unemployment dynamics in market economies. For example, Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005) 
find that more than half of the rise in Western European unemployment from the 1960s to the first 
half of the 1990s is explained by changes in institutions, particularly welfare benefits, labour 
taxes, unions and employment protection. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) argue on the other hand 
that the rise in unemployment is explained not by institutions themselves, but rather by 
interactions between institutions and shocks. 
The importance of financial disincentives for employed and unemployed workers is analysed, for 
example, in Pedersen and Smith (2002). Based on a panel survey merged with administrative 
registers, they measure the financial incentives for Danish labour participants between 
employment and being on unemployment benefits, while they also account for fixed costs of work 
such as commuting and child care costs. The results show that in 1996, 6% of men and 13% of 
women had effective replacement rates higher than 100%, which they associate with substantial 
work disincentives (unemployment traps). While they also include several attitude measures into 
the regressions, the main conclusion is that financial measures have the strongest influence on the 
risk of being in an unemployment trap. 
The evidence on the role of institutions in explaining unemployment paths is less straightforward 
for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Boeri and Terrell (2002) find 
that relatively generous non-employment benefits in CEE economies established a wage floor in 
the 1990s that increased the pace of restructuring by shedding less productive labour. Their 
evidence, however, does not say whether welfare benefits are responsible for high unemployment 
rates. Focusing on the role of welfare benefits, Jurajda and Münich (2002) explore the mechanism 
of the rise in long-term unemployment in the economies of CEE using the case of the Czech 
Republic. They provide evidence on the importance of observable worker characteristics in 
driving Czech long-term unemployment and find a significant effect of welfare generosity on 
families with more than three children and low-educated parents. On the other hand, Commander 
and Heitmueller (2007) find little evidence that institutions, primarily unemployment benefits, can 
explain differences in unemployment rates or flows in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
They use OECD net replacement rates for specific family types and merge the rates with the 
individual level Labour Force Survey data, controlling for the number of children, marital status 
and the length of unemployment.
1
The Czech labour market provides a unique opportunity to investigate the effect of welfare 
benefits on labour market dynamics. While the unemployment rate was extraordinarily low in 
international comparison in the 1990s, it increased substantially at the end of the last decade and 
remained high until 2005. The tax-benefit system may be blamed for contributing to the rise in 
unemployment, as it was overhauled in 1996. In particular, providing relatively high welfare 
income increases the reservation wages of the unemployed, attenuating job search incentives. 
Furthermore, if welfare benefits affect labour market dynamics, decreasing the package of welfare 
benefits would alleviate high unemployment. Tax-benefit reform is also recommended by 
 
1 The OECD net replacement rates are calculated using tax-benefit equations for particular wage levels and types 
of households in order to investigate the prevalence of high net replacement rates, indicating the presence of 
unemployment traps (OECD, 2004; OECD, 2007; or Carone et al., 2004). 4   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
                                                          
international institutions with the aim of reducing persistent fiscal deficits and ensuring fiscal 
sustainability (OECD, 2006). 
While the Czech tax system is comprehensively described, for example, in Bronchi and Burns 
(2000), there is only scant evidence on the interactions between taxes and benefits. Průša (2001) 
describes the social security system and displays distributions of households receiving particular 
benefits. His evidence is based on data from the Ministry of Labour. Using income surveys 
(Mikrocenzus), Večerník (2002, 2006) analyses the joint effect of taxes and benefits on the 
distribution of household income. Based on household budget survey data, Schneider and Jelínek 
(2001) and Schneider (2004) examine in more detail the effects of the Czech social security 
system on household income distribution. Although some of these studies rely on individual-level 
data, their results concern aggregate measures. Jurajda and Zubricky (2005) calculate net 
replacement rates and marginal effective tax rates for a wide range of family types and earnings 
levels and assess how they affect work incentives. They also compare the tax-benefit system with 
recent government proposals for reform. 
In this paper we ask to what extent Czech taxes and benefits affect employment and 
unemployment and labour market flows through work incentives. We derive tax-benefit equations 
for 1996 and 2006 and, using these equations, we analyse for specific household types’ net 
replacement rates between the net household income when a person stays at home and the net 
household income when the person works. We compare the net replacement rates for specific 
household types with the evidence on labour market flows. We also investigate which instruments 
particularly affect net household income, increasing net replacement rates. We match tax-benefit 
equations with the individual-level income survey Mikrocenzus 2002, creating a microsimulation 
model, and analyse the incidence of high net replacement rates and the extent of unemployment 
and inactivity traps in 2006 stemming from the combined effect of taxes and benefits.
2 We 
analyse the recent changes to benefits introduced in 2007 and their effect on work incentives and 
also assess the budgetary impact of the reform. In the paper we concentrate on the pure effects of 
the combination of taxes and benefits on labour market behaviour, and neglect, for example, 
redistributive effects or the incidence of poverty rates. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines some stylised facts on the Czech labour 
market based on information from the Czech Labour Force Survey (LFS). Section 3 then 
describes the system of taxes and benefits in the Czech Republic, using 2006 as the reference 
year, while we also describe the changes introduced in 2007. We focus on those taxes and benefits 
which we use in the microsimulations or which are available in the dataset. Section 4 outlines the 
available dataset, while Section 5 describes the model. We particularly identify the variables 
required in order to implement the simulations. Section 5 also discusses data ageing and describes 
the model and other modelling issues, such as coverage, the informal economy and the non-take-
up of benefits. In Section 6 we discuss the results, while Section 7 concludes. Additional tables 




2 In a similar way, Immervoll (2002) examines the distribution of effective tax rates in EU member states using 
the EUROMOD model, a microsimulation model for the EU15 countries. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   5 
 
                                                          
2. Stylised Facts 
In this section
3 we present a few stylised facts on the Czech labour market based on information 
from the Czech Labour Force Survey (LFS).
4 The previous literature provides inconclusive results 
on the demographic factors of labour market flows. For example, Sorm and Terrell (2000) explore 
demographic factors of labour market flows in 1994–1998 using the Czech LFS. They find that 
married people are more likely to be employed than single people, while age and education are 
also highly significant determinants of the labour market flows. They focus, however, on 
individual demographic characteristics such as gender, marital status, education and age, 
neglecting household composition. In what follows, we therefore focus on the presence of 
children and a partner in the household, including information on the partner’s labour supply, in 
explaining patterns of labour market stocks and flows. 
The unemployment rate was very low in the Czech Republic until the mid-1990s, but has 
increased dramatically since then. While the average rate of unemployment was 4.0% in 1995, it 
increased to as much as 7.3% in 2002 (the last column in Table 1).
5 The upsurge in the 
unemployment rate after the mid-1990s was due to a recession in that period and was associated 
with considerable changes in labour market flows. In particular, the inflow rate into 
unemployment almost doubled in the second half of the 1990s, while the outflow rate from 
unemployment decreased in that period, increasing the incidence of long-term unemployment 
(Galuščák and Münich, 2007). 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show specific unemployment rates for selected household types. Six 
household types are defined, namely, without or with children, and also without a partner or with 
a partner (a second adult household member), either non-working or working. The results suggest 
that the unemployment rate increased for all household types at the end of the 1990s, and 
particularly by as much as 6 percentage points between 1995 and 2002 for single adults living 
with children. For that household type, the unemployment rate is the highest, reaching 13.7% in 
2002. On the other hand, the unemployment rate is the lowest for persons from households with a 
working partner, either with or without children (4.6% and 4.1% respectively in 2002); it 
increased by only about 2 percentage points between 1995 and 2002. 
 
 
3 We thank Martin Guzi from CERGE-EI for calculating the aggregate stocks and flows which we use in this 
section. 
4 The unemployment analysed in this section complies with the ILO definition, i.e. an unemployed individual 
does not have a job, is actively seeking a job, and is ready to start working within two weeks. In the simulations 
presented in Section 6, the unemployed are either recipients of unemployment benefits (labelled as short-term 
unemployed, as unemployment benefits expire after 6 months) or not (long-term unemployed). In both cases, 
registration with a district labour office is assumed. For the long-term unemployed, registration and active job 
search is required in order to be eligible for social assistance benefits. The unemployment used in the simulations 
thus complies with the registry unemployment. In 2006, the ILO unemployment rate was 7.1%, while the 
registry unemployment rate was 8.6%. Both unemployment rates follow the same trends. In addition, the registry 
unemployment may be considered “voluntary” due to rather poor monitoring of job search activity by labour 
offices. While the net replacement rates analysed in Section 6 are indicators of work decisions made by 
individuals, the unemployment rates and flows investigated in this section describe involuntary unemployment. 
5 In this section we compare stocks and flows in 1995 and 2002 in order to capture the major changes on the 
labour market observed at the end of the 1990s. The available dataset ends in the second quarter of 2004. 6   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 



















1995 5.0  3.7  2.0 7.6 5.1  2.7 4.0 
2002 10.1  8.3  4.1 13.7 7.7  4.6  7.3 
2002–1995 5.1  4.6  2.1 6.0 2.6  2.0 3.3 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 











I / 9 4I / 9 5I / 9 6I / 9 7I / 9 8I / 9 9I / 0 0I / 0 1I / 0 2I / 0 3I / 0 4
single, no children non-working partner, no children
working partner, no children single, children
non-working partner, children working partner, children
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
Table 2 displays transition rates from unemployment into employment and out of the labour force. 
The overall flows shown in the last column indicate that for an unemployed person, the risk of 
being unemployed a year later increased substantially between 1995 and 2002, while the 
probability of the job seeker finding a job decreased by almost the same amount. The transition 
rates from unemployment exhibit the same pattern for all household types as for the overall 
sample. The risk of being unemployed is the highest for single adults with children (0.91 in 2002), 
while it is the lowest for individuals with a working partner (0.80 with and 0.85 without children 
in 2002). On the other hand, the probability of an unemployed single adult individual living with 
children finding a job was the lowest among all the household types (0.07 in 2002), while it was 
the highest in 2002 for unemployed persons from households with a working partner (0.17 with 
children, 0.11 without children). 
The results suggest that household composition, and particularly the presence of another adult 
person in the household and her or his labour supply, significantly affects the unemployment rate 
and the risk of being unemployed. In particular, the unemployment rate as well as the risk for 
unemployed persons of being unemployed a year later are the highest for single adults living with 
children. On the other hand, the unemployment rate and the probability of remaining unemployed 
are the lowest for households where there is a working partner. This suggests that labour supply is 
often a joint decision within couples. On the other hand, less labour market experience and low 
attachment to the labour market may to some extent explain the high unemployment rate of single 
parents. These are important factors to incorporate into the analysis of the link between net 
replacement rates and labour market flows, as the unemployment analysed in this section is 
involuntary.  Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   7 
 






















U->U          
1995 0.74 0.69 0.70  0.80  0.76 0.65 0.70 
2002 0.89 0.89 0.85  0.91  0.89 0.80 0.85 
2002–1995 0.15  0.19  0.15  0.11  0.13 0.16 0.15 
U->E          
1995 0.22 0.20 0.24  0.17  0.19 0.29 0.24 
2002 0.08 0.08 0.11  0.07  0.09 0.17 0.12 
2002–1995 -0.14  -0.11  -0.13  -0.10  -0.10 -0.13 -0.12 
U->O          
1995 0.04 0.11 0.06  0.07  0.06 0.06 0.06 
2002 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.02  0.02 0.03 0.03 
2002–1995 -0.01  -0.08  -0.02  -0.05  -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
Note: Transitions from unemployment (U) into employment (E) and out of the labour force (O). 
 
3. Taxes and Benefits 
The Czech tax-benefit system consists of taxes and social and health insurance contributions (see 
subsection 3.1) and social benefits (see subsection 3.2).
6 The main reference year is 2006, while 
we also briefly describe the system in the years before 2006. The main changes to taxes and 
benefits introduced in 2007 are described in subsection 3.3.  
Taxes and benefits are in general administered at the central level, with the exception of social 
assistance benefits, which are provided at the municipal level. Table A8 (in the Appendix) shows 
the amounts of income, taxes and benefits in 2006.
7
3.1 Taxes and Social Contributions 
The Czech taxation system consists of income taxes, including social and health contributions, 
consumption taxes and property taxes. The income taxes include personal income tax and 
corporate income tax. Social and health insurance contributions, which may be viewed as a type 
of income tax, include contributions for social insurance and the state employment policy, and 
public health insurance contributions. The consumption taxes consist of value added tax (VAT), 
excise taxes and customs. Finally, property taxes include road tax, real estate tax, inheritance tax, 
gift tax and real estate transfer tax. We focus our description on personal income tax and social 
and health insurance contributions, which we use in the microsimulations. 
 
                                                           
6 We focus our description on the instruments which we use in the model. 
7 All pecuniary values are in Czech crowns (CZK). The average exchange rate was 28.3 CZK/EUR in 2006. 8   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
                                                          
3.1.1 Personal Income Tax 
Personal income tax
8 is paid by a person who has residence or lives in the Czech Republic for at 
least 183 days in a year. The tax base for personal income tax is divided into five groups: 
1) wages and salaries; 2) income from business activities, including income from agriculture, 
forestry and fishery, and income from copyright; 3) capital income, including dividends and 
interest; revenues from expiration of contracts of complementary pension insurance with state 
support; income from life insurance (minus premiums paid); income from options and forwards; 
honoraria; 4) rental income; and 5) other income. Other income includes income from occasional 
activities exceeding 20,000 CZK per year. Some types of income are taxed at a separate tax rate 
(described below). 
The tax base does not include sickness benefits, state social support, social assistance, 
unemployment benefit, the amount of pensions lower than 162,000 CZK per year, stipends, tax 
bonuses, loans and drafts, income from property insurance, benefactions, alimony, travel expenses 
paid by employers, meals or beverages provided by employers, social insurance contributions paid 
by employers, winnings in state lotteries, income from appreciation of currency, etc., and income 
taxed according to a separate tax scheme. Furthermore, the tax base does not include income from 
selling one’s own house or flat if a person has lived there for at least two years before the transfer 
or if the time between buying and selling the house or flat was more than five years. 
Entrepreneurs may account for losses in order to reduce their profit, but only in the case of the 
same activity. For example, a loss made on main entrepreneurial activity may not be deducted 
from rental income. For entrepreneurs, taxable income is also net of costs. Instead of deducting 
the amount of actual costs, a taxpayer may replace it by 80% (50% until 2005) of revenues from 
agriculture, forestry and fishery, 60% of revenue from technical enterprise (25% until 2005), 50% 
of revenue from non-technical enterprise (25% until 2005), 40% of revenues of copyright (30% 
until 2005) or 30% of rental revenues (20% until 2005). If the entrepreneur’s spouse or other 
household members (except children in compulsory schooling) help the entrepreneur with his or 
her business, the taxable income from this partnership is divided among the household members.  
There is a minimum tax base for entrepreneurs who have gross income of more than 15,000 CZK 
in a year. The minimum tax base is not compulsory for entrepreneurs paying lump-sum income 
tax
9, entrepreneurs who started their activity in the current or previous year or ended business 
activity this year, entrepreneurs receiving parental allowance from state social support, old-age 
pensions, invalidity pensions, part invalidity pension for at least one month in the year, benefit for 




8 Income tax is paid by corporations and individuals. Since the microsimulation model is household-oriented, the 
following paragraphs are devoted to personal income tax. 
9 Lump-sum tax may be applied in the case of specific entrepreneurial activities. It is paid in advance by 
entrepreneurs with no employees with a yearly taxable income of less than 1,000,000 CZK in the last three years, 
and is designed to help them reduce costs for book-keeping and accounting. The minimum lump-sum tax is 
600 CZK per year, and the amount depends on forecasted income as agreed with the tax authority. Tax rates are 
the same as in the case of income taxation. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   9 
 
Taxpayers may deduct the following exemptions from their tax base: 
•  Social and health insurance contributions paid (see subsection 3.1.2). 
•  Gifts to charitable organisations may be deducted if the amount of the gift is at least 2% of 
the tax base or 1,000 CZK, and if the charity is recognised by the state. The taxpayer may 
deduct at most 10% of the tax base. 
•  Interest used for mortgage repayments. 
•  Complementary pension insurance with state support. The total deductible amount is the sum 
of all payments to complementary pension funds exceeding 6,000 CZK. The amount deducted 
may not exceed 12,000 CZK. 
•  Private life insurance. The maximum total deductible amount is 12,000 CZK. The taxpayer 
must be insured for at least five years,  and must be under 60. The minimum amount of 
insurance premium is 40,000 CZK if the duration of insurance is between 5 and 15 years, and 
70,000 CZK if the duration is more than 15 years.  
•  Labour union fees paid to labour unions. The maximum amount is either 1.5% of the taxable 
income or 3,000 CZK.
10 
 
Married couples with at least one child all living in the same household may choose to fill out a 
joint tax return. They may do so if they are eligible at least on the last day of the year. The tax 
base of the couple is the sum of their personal tax bases. The base, net of the exemptions listed 
above, is split evenly between the two taxpayers, and the tax is determined separately for each. 
Joint taxation may not be applied if either person is bound by the minimum tax base or pays lump-
sum personal income tax. Joint taxation was introduced in 2006, while couples were allowed to 
fill in a joint income tax return for 2005. 
The income tax is paid from the tax base minus social and health insurance contributions and 
other tax deductible items. The calculation is based on the following scheme:
11
Tax base  Tax 
0–121,200 CZK  12% 
121,200–218,400 CZK  14,544 CZK + 19% on amount over 121,200 CZK 
218,400–331,200 CZK  33,012 CZK + 25% on amount over 218,400 CZK 
331,200 CZK and over  61,212 CZK + 32% on amount over 331,200 CZK 
 
Taxpayers may deduct the following amounts from their income tax: 
•  Personal allowance for each taxpayer (7,200 CZK). If the taxpayer was collecting an old-
age pension throughout the year, he or she may not apply this exemption if his/her yearly 
pension was higher than 38,040 CZK. If the taxpayer started to collect an old-age pension 
                                                           
10 In addition to these exemptions, the following items could be exempted prior to 2006: personal exemption for 
each taxpayer; spouse exemption if a spouse lived with the taxpayer in the same household and did not have a 
yearly gross income higher than 38,040 CZK; disability exemption if receiving full or part-invalidity pension; 
and student exemption for students. 
11 The income tax burden was eased for low-income groups as of January 2006. Before 2006, the first tax bracket 
was 0–109,200 CZK, while the first two marginal tax rates were 15% and 20%. 10   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
                                                          
later than January, he or she may deduct 7,200 CZK independently of the amount of the 
pension.  
•  Spouse allowance (4,200 CZK) applies if a spouse lives with the taxpayer in the same 
household and does not have a yearly income higher than 38,040 CZK. If the spouse is 
disabled, the allowance rises to 8,400 CZK. The income of the spouse tested for this 
purpose is generally in gross terms. It does not include disability pension, state social 
support, social care benefits, state support for complementary pension insurance, state 
support for savings for building purposes, or stipends.
12 
•  Disability allowance (1,500 CZK) may be deducted if the taxpayer receives a part-
invalidity pension. If the taxpayer receives a full invalidity pension, he or she may deduct 
3,000 CZK. If the taxpayer is especially heavily disabled, he or she may deduct 9,600 
CZK. 
•  Student allowance (2,400 CZK) may be deducted if the taxpayer is less than 26 and is an 
undergraduate student, or if he/she is a graduate student and is less than 28.  
•  Allowance per child. Families with children whose taxable income is at least six times the 
minimum wage may deduct from their income tax a tax allowance per child.
13 The child 
or children must live in the same household as the parents, or may alternatively be 
temporarily placed in institutions for the purposes of study or preparation for future work. 
The amount of the allowance is 6,000 CZK per child, up to a maximum of five children. If 
the tax duty is lower than the tax allowance, the difference is called a tax bonus and is 
paid to the taxpayer, while the taxpayer’s tax duty is then 0 CZK. If the tax duty is higher 
than the tax allowance, the taxpayer pays the difference between the two.  
Except for personal allowance, the taxpayer deducts 1/12 of the amount for each month during 
which the conditions listed above are met. The allowance per child and tax bonus may be 
deducted as of 2005, replacing an exemption amount per child. The other allowances listed above 
were introduced in 2006, replacing tax deductible items. 
A dependent child for the purposes of tax allowances or bonuses is defined as one’s own child, an 
adopted child, a child in foster care, children of one’s spouse and grandchildren if they are 
younger than 18, or younger than 26 if not receiving full invalidity pension and currently 
preparing for future employment. A child who cannot prepare for future employment because of 
injury, long-term illness or disability that prevents work is also considered dependent. If a parent, 
grandparent or spouse of a parent does not have his or her own taxable income, so that a tax bonus 
cannot be paid to him or her, then the bonus is paid to another person who lives in the same 
household with the child and has taxable income. 
The minimum income which is subject to income tax is 15,000 CZK. The minimum tax amount 
which is paid is 200 CZK.  





12 Spouse allowance may be applied for one’s own spouse only. On the other hand, the definition of a family for 
the purposes of state social support and social assistance includes spouses or partners. 
13 A person is eligible for a tax allowance if at least 90% of his or her taxable income is earned in the Czech 
Republic. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   11 
 
10% tax rate 
•  Income of authors publishing in newspapers or other media if this income is less than 
3,000 CZK per month. 
 
15% tax rate  
•  Dividends from bonds and drafts. 
•  Interest on current personal accounts. 
•  Income from complementary pension insurance with state support (state support is not 
taxed) and income from life insurance (except income when the contract is terminated; in 
that case, the income is taxed using the regular tax scheme). 
•  Income from occasional work less than 5,000 CZK per month. 
•  Income from the liquidation of a company. 
 
20% tax rate 
•  Winnings in lotteries (with the exception of state lotteries).  
 
3.1.2 Social and Health Insurance Contributions 
Social and health insurance contributions consist of social insurance and state employment policy 
contributions (further divided into pension insurance, contributions for the state employment 
policy
14 and sickness insurance), and health insurance contributions. All the contributions are 
summarised in the following table. 
 Employee 
Employer     
 (per employee) 
Entrepreneur 
Social Insurance  8.0%  26.0%  34.0% 
of which:   Pension  6.5%  21.5%  28.0% 
Employment 0.4%  1.2%  1.6% 
Sickness 1.1%  3.3%  4.4%* 
Health Insurance  4.5%  9.0%  13.5% 
Total 12.5%  35.0%  47.5% 
Note: * paid on a voluntary basis. 
 
Social insurance and state employment policy contributions are paid by employers, employees 
and individual entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs pay sickness insurance voluntarily and from main 
business activity only. Pension insurance may be paid voluntarily by students, entrepreneurs from 
abroad and persons registered with labour offices but not receiving unemployment benefits. In 
these cases, registration is required. 
The contributory base is the gross wage plus any bonuses, but not income which is not subject to 
income taxation, occasional income, income taxed under a separate tax scheme, recompensation, 
etc. For entrepreneurs, the monthly contribution base is at least 50% of the monthly average gross 
income from the previous year, but not more than 40,500 CZK per month.  
Contributions for public health insurance are paid by employers, employees, entrepreneurs and 
the state. For employee and employer, the contributory base is the gross wage and bonuses, except 
                                                           
14 Within the state employment policy, unemployment benefits and active labour programmes are provided. 12   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
the income that is not subject to income tax. The contributory base also does not include payments 
made by employers for complementary pension insurance with state support. For each day when a 
worker is absent from work or is on unpaid leave, the contributory base is the average daily 
minimum wage in the economy. The minimum contributory base for employees equals the 
minimum wage. 
The contributory base is 4,708 CZK for persons for whom public health insurance is paid by the 
state (e.g. students, pensioners and children). For entrepreneurs, the base is 50% of the monthly 
average gross income in the previous year, but not more than 40,500 CZK per month. 
3.1.3 Consumption and Property Taxes 
Value added tax is levied on goods, real estate transfers, services provided in the Czech Republic 
and goods imported from outside the European Union. The tax is also levied on vehicles imported 
from EU Member States and goods from EU Member States which are subject to excise taxes in 
the Czech Republic. The standard tax rate is 19%, with a preferential rate of 5% applied to 
groceries, non-alcoholic beverages, books, etc. Other consumption taxes include excise taxes 
(levied on mineral oil, alcohol, beer, etc.) and customs. 
Property taxes include road tax (paid for vehicles), real estate tax (levied on land and buildings), 
inheritance tax (paid by inheritors), gift tax (paid by benefactors) and real estate transfer tax (paid 
by those selling real estate). 
3.2 Social Benefits 
Social benefits include social insurance benefits, state social support and social assistance. Social 
insurance benefits are contributory and insurance-based, while state social support and social 
assistance benefit are non-contributory and financed via taxes. The benefits may be broken down 
into the following categories: 
•  Social insurance benefits 
o  Unemployment benefits 
o  Sickness benefits 
o  Pensions 
•  State social support 
o  Means-tested: child benefit, social supplement, housing benefit 
o  Non-means-tested: parental allowance, foster care benefit, funeral grant, birth 
grant 
•  Social assistance 
o  Social assistance benefits 
o  Social care benefits. 
 
The system is organised around the minimum living standard (MLS), which is calculated at the 
personal and household level, and is intended to reflect the cost of living. Most types of benefits 
are then defined as given percentages of the overall family level MLS. The personal part of the 
MLS is defined per each person in the household and depends on the age of the person. On the 
other hand, the household part of the MLS depends on how many people live in the household, 
and reflects living expenses. The following table summarises the monthly amounts of the MLS in 





Number of persons 
Household MLS 
(CZK) 
0–6  1,750 1 2,020 
6–10  1,950 2 2,630 
10–15  2,310  3 or 4  3,260 
15–26  2,530  5 and over  3,660 
Adults 2,400     
3.2.1 Social Insurance 
Benefits based on social insurance include unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and pensions. 
Unemployment benefit and sickness benefit are not taxable, while pensions above 162,000 CZK 
per year are subject to income tax. 
Unemployment Benefits 
Unemployment benefits are available to individuals actively searching for a job who were 
employed for at least 12 months in the previous three years and who are not receiving an old-age 
pension, full invalidity pension or sickness benefits. The employment record required to be 
eligible for unemployment benefits includes specific periods such as military or civil service, 
custody of a child under three years, etc. A person is entitled to unemployment benefit if he or she 
was employed for at least six months after the end of the previous unemployment spell. An 
unemployed person registered with a labour office may have monthly income from work up to 
half of the statutory minimum wage per month.
15
The benefit is calculated from income net of social insurance contributions and income tax in the 
previous job, or the net profit from previous entrepreneurial activity. The amount of the benefit is 
50% of the previous income in the first three months and 45% in the following three months of 
the unemployment spell, but not more than 2.5 times the MLS of an adult one-member household 
(i.e. at most 11,050 CZK per month in 2006).
16 The amount of unemployment benefit is increased 
for persons in retraining organised by a district labour office. Furthermore, the benefit is paid for 
longer than six months for persons older than 50. 
Sickness Benefits 
Disablement benefit is paid for all days that a person is disabled, but for not more than one year, 
or at most two years if the person is disabled due to work injury. The amount of the disablement 
benefit is relatively low at the beginning, but increases after the first three days of illness and 
again after two weeks. The replacement rate between the benefit and the previous gross wage is 
low, particularly for persons with medium and high earnings. 
Maternity allowance is available to women who give birth to one or more children and who have 
paid health insurance for at least 270 days in the previous two years. Eligible entrepreneurs must 
have paid health insurance for at least 180 days in the last year before the birth. The woman must 
not have a paid job and may not run her own business. The allowance is paid for at most 28 
weeks, or 37 weeks to a woman who has had more than one child or is single or a widow or does 
not live with a partner. 
                                                           
15 This condition was introduced in October 2004. The average monthly minimum wage was 7,763 CZK in 
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Other benefits include benefit for treatment of a family member and maternity and pregnancy 
benefit. The former benefit is available to a person caring for an ill child provided that the child 
lives in the same household as the benefit recipient. The latter benefit is paid to a woman working 
in a less well-paid position because of her pregnancy or maternity with the aim of compensating 
her for the lost income. 
Pensions 
Five types of pensions are provided in the Czech Republic: old-age pensions, full invalidity 
pensions, part-invalidity pensions, widow or widower pensions, and orphan pensions. Pensions 
are not simulated, as they are determined by the average income in the years prior to retirement. 
Until 1995, the statutory old-age pension age was 60 for men and 57 for women with no children, 
56 for women who had raised one child, 55 for women with two children, 54 for women with 
three or four children, and 53 for women with five or more children. The pension age has been 
increasing by two months for men and four months for women each year since 1996, and this will 
continue until the end of 2012. In 2006, the pension age was 61 years and 8 months for men, 60 
years and 4 months for childless women, 59 years and 4 months for women with one child, etc. 
A person may decide to work longer than until the age at which he or she is eligible for an old-age 
pension. The pension is then increased to account for the period of later retirement. A person 
receiving old-age pension may also have widow or widower pension, state social support and 
social assistance, but not unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, full invalidity pension or part-
invalidity pension. A person may also claim a pension three years before he or she reaches the 
statutory pension age. When drawing a full (part) invalidity pension, the person may claim a 
pension five (two) years before the statutory pension age. The amount of the pension is decreased 
accordingly. 
3.2.2 State Social Support 
All benefits provided through state social support are non-taxable and may be divided between 
means-tested and non-means-tested benefits. Net household income for the purposes of income 
tests for state social support is defined as income net of income tax and contributions, stipends, 
housing supplements from employers, bonuses, alimony, sickness benefits, unemployment 
benefits, income from abroad and pensions. The tax bonus per child is not included. Net profit 
from entrepreneurial activity is included if it is greater than zero. On the other hand, net household 
income does not include any debts. 
A family is defined for the purposes of state social support (except housing benefit, for which all 
persons with the same domicile address are considered) as a person, dependent children, parents 
of dependent children, spouses or partners, and dependent children of dependent children (if they 
are not married, widowed or divorced) if they live with the person in the same household and 
meet the costs of living together. If a dependent child is under 18, the condition of meeting the 
costs of living together is not required. If a dependent child is over 18 and under 26 and is training 
for future employment, the condition of meeting the costs together is not required if the child has 
the same domicile address as his or her parents. A spouse is considered to be a household 
member. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   15 
 
A dependent child for the purposes of state social support is classified as a child that has not yet 
finished compulsory schooling and until 26 if he or she is training for future employment and 
lives in the same household as his or her parents, or, alternatively, if the child cannot train for 
future employment because of injury or long-term illness or if the child is not able to work. A 
child is also dependent between the end of compulsory schooling and 18 if registered at a district 
labour office and not receiving unemployment benefit. A child receiving a full invalidity pension 
is not considered a dependent child. For the purposes of state social support, the condition of 
living in the same household is not tested if the child is under 18 and training for future 
employment, or is between 18 and 26 and shares the same domicile address as his or her parents. 
A dependent child may temporarily live outside the household for the purposes of study or 
training for future work. Similarly, a spouse may temporarily live out of the household because of 
work duties, for example.
17
Means-tested Benefits 
Child Benefit  
Child benefit is targeted at families with children if their net household income is less than 
of the family. The net household income which is tested for the purposes of child benefit 
is the net household income (defined above) plus foster care benefit and parental allowance. The 
relevant period for the income test is the calendar year prior to the year when the income is tested. 
MLS × 3
The benefit is provided per each dependent child in the following amount:  
sMLS Child A it ChildBenef ' × =  
where 
A = 0.32 if the net household income is lower than 1.1 x MLS, 
A = 0.28 if the net household income is between 1.1 x MLS and 1.8 x MLS, 
A = 0.14 if the net household income is between 1.8 x MLS and 3 x MLS. 
Social Supplement 
A social supplement is available to families with at least one dependent child if their net income 
was less than  in the previous quarter. Net household income for the purposes of the 
income test is the net household income relevant for the child benefit test plus child benefit. The 
relevant time span for the income test is the previous calendar quarter. 
MLS × 6 . 1







TotalMLS NetIncome sMLS Children
sMLS Children fit SocialBene
} , max{ '
'  
 
where A = 1.6. 
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The children’s part of the MLS may be increased by multiplying the allowance by 2.7 if the child 
is disabled, 2.4 if the child is partially disabled, 1.2 if the child is persistently ill and 1.1 if children 
are born within three years. The household part of the MLS can be multiplied by 1.4 if both or just 
one parent is disabled, 1.1 if one of the parents is disabled, and by 1.05 for a single parent (who 
does not need to be disabled). If several conditions are fulfilled, the social supplement is then the 
sum of the basic allowance and the sum of allowances calculated as allowances with particular 
conditions, minus the basic allowance. 
Housing Benefit 
Housing benefit is available to families who own or rent a flat and whose net income was below 
1.6 × MLS in the previous quarter. A household or a family is defined as all persons residing at 
the same domicile address. The household may thus contain, for example, non-relative persons 
such as tenants. Housing benefit is received by the household head. Due to common practice, 
however, we assume for the purposes of the microsimulations that a household is defined in the 
same way as for state social support and for social assistance. 
Net household income for the purposes of the income test for housing benefit is the same as for 
the social supplement, i.e. the net household income relevant for the child benefit income test plus 
child benefit. The relevant period for the income test is also the same as for the social supplement, 
i.e. the calendar quarter before the income is tested. 
The amount is calculated using the following formula: 
6 . 1






TotalMLS NetIncome sMLS Household




Parental allowance is available to a parent who cares in person and on a daily basis for a child up 
to four years old, or up to seven years old when the child is disabled. If the person receives 
maternity benefit or sickness benefit associated with childbearing, the amount of these benefits is 
subtracted from the parental allowance. The amount of the parental allowance is  of an 
adult person (  before May 2004), i.e. 3,696 CZK in 2006. 
MLS × 54 . 1
MLS × 1 . 1
Foster Care Benefit 
Foster care benefit is available to foster parents caring for a child, except for periods spent by the 
child in childcare or similar institutions. The amount of the benefit for a child is  × 2 . 1  the 
children’s part of the MLS or  the children’s part of the MLS if the child is dependent. The 
benefit is increased if the child is persistently ill or disabled. 
× 0 . 2
The benefit may be increased by a foster parent allowance which equals   of the foster 
parent, provided that the child lives in the same household. Furthermore, there is a one-off bonus 
of  of the foster parent when the parent adopts a child. 
MLS × 5 . 0
MLS × 4
 
 Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   17 
 
Funeral Grant 
A one-off funeral grant of 5,000 CZK is available to a person arranging a funeral.  
Birth Grant 
A birth grant is available to any mother who gives birth to one or more children. The amount is 
MLS of a child younger than six (17,500 CZK). If two or more children are born, the amount 





3.2.3 Social Assistance 
Social assistance includes social assistance benefits and social care benefits. While social 
assistance benefits are means-tested, social care benefits are non-tested. 
Social Assistance Benefits 
Social assistance benefit serves as a last resort. When the net household income, including any 
state social support benefits, is less than the family-level MLS, the household is entitled to social 
assistance benefit calculated as 
 
NetIncome MLS Benefit SocialAss − = .  
 
In other words, the social necessity benefit tops up the net household income to the household 
level MLS. Net household income is defined as the average monthly income, net of income tax 
and contributions, or the net profit of entrepreneurs plus unemployment benefit, sickness benefit, 
pensions and state social support. Net profit from entrepreneurial activity is included at the level 
of at least the MLS of a one-person household (including the personal and household part of the 
MLS). The tax bonus is not considered. 
A family and a dependent child are defined in the same way as for state social support, with the 
exception of housing benefit. The condition that the household must meet the costs of living 
together is always tested here. A temporary period spent outside the household for the purposes of 
work or training for future employment is allowed. 
Social assistance benefit may be increased to account for the cost of housing or costs related to 
health, etc. Conversely, it can be lowered if the person is not actively searching for a job or active 
in improving his or her own financial situation, etc. Furthermore, the amount of the benefit is 
increased by 600 CZK if the person is disabled. 
Social Care Benefits 
Social care benefits are one-off specific allowances usually paid to disabled people for specific 
purposes such as homecare services, spa services, increased cost of diabetic food, wheelchair 
purchase, etc. 
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3.3 Taxes and Benefits in 2007 
Taxes and social and health contributions were not changed in 2007. On the other hand, major 
changes to some benefits were implemented. The main pillar of the reform was the changeover to 
a one-component construction of the minimum living standard level and the introduction of an 
existence minimum. Consequently, the income test rules were adjusted for child benefit and the 
social supplement. Major changes to parental allowance, housing benefit and social assistance 
were introduced. 
The concept of the minimum living standard was changed to reflect the number of persons in the 
household only. In particular, household level MLS amounts are no longer defined, while the 
personal amounts account for the second and further adults in the household at a reduced rate. The 
following table summarises the monthly amounts of the MLS in 2007: 
 
Category MLS  (CZK) 
First adult  2,880 
Second and further adults  2,600 
Child (age 0–6)  1,600 
Child (age 6–15)  1,960 
Child (age 15–26)  2,250 
One-member household  3,126 
 
For the first adult person in the household, the MLS is 2,880 CZK. The amount for the second and 
further adults is reduced to 2,600 CZK. The amount for children depends on their age. The last 
row in the table shows the MLS for households with one member (3,126 CZK). 
In addition to the new MLS concept, a so-called “existence minimum” of 2,020 CZK a month was 
introduced as the minimum amount necessary to survive. It replaces the MLS in the formula for 
social assistance benefits if an unemployed person does not cooperate to improve his situation 
(refuses job offers etc.). The existence minimum is not applied to dependent children or persons 
receiving full invalidity or old-age pension or older than 65. 
Unemployment Benefit 
The maximum amount of unemployment benefit was increased to 58% of the economy-wide 
average wage in the first three quarters of the preceding year, i.e. 11,722 CZK, while it was 
11,050 CK in 2006. The minimum amount is 12% of the average wage in the first three quarters 
of the preceding year. 
Child Benefit 
The coefficients in the formula for child benefit were adjusted to reflect the changes in the MLS. 
Child benefit is provided in the following amounts: 
 
sMLS Child A it ChildBenef ' × =  
where 
A = 0.36 if the net household income is lower than 1.5 x MLS, 
A = 0.31 if the net household income is between 1.5 x MLS and 2.4 x MLS, 
A = 0.16 if the net household income is between 2.4 x MLS and 4 x MLS. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   19 
 
Social Supplement 
Following the MLS reform, parameter A in the formula for social supplement has increased to 
2.2. 
Housing Benefit 
The construction of housing benefit was changed to account for housing costs. The household is 
entitled to this benefit if its housing costs are higher than 30% (35% in Prague) of the net 
household income, while the housing costs are at most normative costs. The normative costs are 
declared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, reflecting the number of persons in the 
household, the number of inhabitants in the municipality, and the type of housing (rental and 
other). The amount of the housing benefit is equal to the difference between the normative costs 
and 30% (35% in Prague) of the net household income. 
If the net household income is lower than the MLS, the household is entitled to the benefit if its 
housing costs are higher than 30% (35% in Prague) of the MLS. The amount of the benefit is 30% 
(35% in Prague) of the MLS.  
Parental Allowance 
The amount of parental allowance has increased substantially to 40% of the average wage in the 
non-profit sector two years before. In 2007 it is equal to 7,582 CZK, while it was 3,696 CZK in 
2006. 
Birth Grant 
As of January 2007, the birth grant is provided in the amount of  × 1 . 11 MLS of a child younger 
than six (17,760 CZK). If two or more children are born, the amount is  MLS of a child 
younger than six per each child born (53,120 CZK for twins, 79,680 CZK for triplets, 106,240 
CZK for quadruplets, etc.). 
× 6 . 16
Social Assistance 
The net household income relevant for the income test reflects 70% of work and other income and 
80% of unemployment benefits and sickness benefits. Within social assistance, a new benefit 
(housing supplement) is provided. It is targeted at households whose net household income, 
including housing benefit and social assistance benefit and after paying housing costs (at most the 
normative costs), is still lower than the MLS. Their income is then topped up to the MLS on the 
assumption that the individual actively seeks a job. Due to common practice, we assume that all 
individuals eligible for social assistance benefits meet the requirement of active job search. 20   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
4. Data 
The dataset that we used for the microsimulations is Mikrocenzus 2002. It was collected in March 
2003 and contains detailed demographic, socio-economic and income data on households in 2002. 
However, using this dataset entails the problem of data ageing between 2002 and the main 
reference year 2006. We also describe the Average Gross Earnings Information System, which we 
use for the purposes of data ageing (see subsection 5.2). 
Mikrocenzus 2002 
The purpose of the survey was to obtain representative data on the income and socio-demographic 
characteristics of households and their individual members. The survey was targeted at 
households, as they represent the main economic unit. 
The data were collected in March 2003, referring to 2002. During the survey, 11,040 flats were 
contacted, i.e. about 0.25% of all permanently occupied flats in the Czech Republic (0.5% in 
Prague). The response rate was 72%, resulting in a total sample of 7,678 flats. The survey 
contains all persons, including tenants and foreigners, regularly living in the selected flats for at 
least one month during 2002 (although students and workers belonging to the flat but staying 
elsewhere are all included). The dataset contains information on the number of months in 
particular labour market states during 2002, but without time succession (the same applies to 
pensions and social income). The survey consists of three questionnaires: part A refers to flats, B 
is for households within a flat, and C is for individuals. The dataset is then divided into a 
household file containing parts A and B, and then an individual file containing part C. 
Questionnaire A refers to whole flats and contains information on persons and their socio-
economic characteristics: birth year, gender, marital status, year of last marriage, highest level of 
education attained, main economic activity in 2002 and income sources. Part A also asks for the 
person’s relationship to the head of the household, information on joint housekeeping with other 
persons living in the flat, and the reason for and the length of absence from the flat during 2002. 
Questionnaire B contains information on households within a flat and consists of three parts: 
•  A self-reported category of net household pecuniary income in 2002; 
•  Pecuniary and non-pecuniary transfers between the household and persons outside the 
household; 
•  Consumption of products from an own farm or enterprise. 
 
Questionnaire C was filled in by persons with their own income in 2002. Persons engaged in 
economic activity were asked to provide information on the type of employment and the 
economic branch of their employer and an estimate of the average hours of work per week. 
Incomes were surveyed in the following categories: 
•  Income from dependent work and pecuniary fringe benefits; 
•  Non-pecuniary fringe benefits from main employment; 
•  Income from entrepreneurial or other self-employment activity, honoraria and pecuniary 
income from such activities transferred to the household; 
•  Social income; 
•  Other income (for example, capital income and rents received). 
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The effect of non-responses leads to biases when aggregating the data using population weights 
from other sources such as Census 2001. The bias is observed mainly for the demographic 
characteristics and social composition of households. In particular, the average household size is 
much lower than in Census. Mikrocenzus also exhibits a lower share of entrepreneurs and job-
seekers. In comparison to Census, the dataset contains a higher share of persons older than the 
statutory retirement age, while almost no bias is detected for town size or house type. The CZSO 
used standard techniques to calculate weighting coefficients to diminish the bias. The weighting 
coefficients were derived for flats and then allocated to households and individuals within flats.  
Another source of bias arises from under-reported or missing data. Missing data on individual 
incomes are negligible in the dataset (0.8%) and were imputed using the so-called “hot-deck” 
method, i.e. taken from randomly selected persons with the same characteristics. According to 
estimates from previous surveys, the income data are under-reported by around 10%. The size of 
under-reporting differs according to the level and the source of income. The data were adjusted to 
correct for under-reporting in the same way as in previous surveys (e.g. Mikrocenzus 1996). At 
the individual level, the income data were compared to other statistical and administrative data 
sources and adjusted accordingly. In particular, data on gross income from dependent work were 
compared to the statistics on average wage across economic branches. Based on this comparison, 
all work incomes were corrected, including income from entrepreneurial activities. In the case of 
social income, some items were adjusted or imputed according to eligibility rules. 
Under-reporting was not corrected for sickness benefit, some state social support benefit and for 
all other incomes. While sickness benefit is under-reported due to poor reporting of short-term 
illnesses, some means-tested benefits depend on a determinative period longer than a year, so that 
these cannot be imputed based on information in Mikrocenzus 2002. Data on pensions were not 
changed, as under-reporting is not prevalent in this case. 
In contrast to under-reporting, unemployment benefits were over-reported, as some persons were 
not able to separate these benefits from social assistance benefits. According to the amount of 
unemployment benefit and the number of months collecting this benefit, a proportion of the total 
unemployment benefit was moved to social assistance or other social income. 
During the survey, wages from main employment were reported in either gross or net terms. The 
CZSO converted all net values in this case into gross values. However, this approach did not take 
into account capital and rental income in the calculation of income taxes. 
The size of the non-survey error was eliminated to a great extent by the CZSO using the 
procedures described in this subsection. On the other hand, the size of the survey error – which is 
naturally large given the size of the sample – was calculated and published by the CZSO. 
The Average Gross Earnings Information System (AEIS) 
The Average Gross Earnings Information System (AEIS), which we used for data ageing, is 
administered by a private company for the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The survey 
provides quarterly information on hourly wages and working hours of employees in selected 
companies in the business sector. It contains detailed information on earnings across gender, age, 
occupations, industries and regions. While companies with more than 1,000 employees are all 
selected, firms with 10 to 999 employees are chosen as a random sample. The total sample 22   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
contains more than 3,500 firms employing approximately 1.3 million workers. The AEIS is the 
only dataset which provides information on wages across gender and occupations which is used 
for the purposes of data ageing. 
5. Model  
In this section we describe the process of model building. In particular, we identify in the dataset 
the instruments described in Section 3. Since the reference year is different from the survey year, 
we overview the issue of data ageing. Then we describe the assumptions and show summary 
statistics for the overall sample and for selected household types. Finally, we discuss other 
modelling issues such as coverage, income from the informal economy and non-take-up of 
benefits. 
5.1 Identification 
In this subsection we identify in the dataset the instruments described in Section 3. Table A2 in 
the Appendix summarises which instruments are available in the dataset and which of them we 
simulate. 
Taxable income for the purposes of personal income tax includes gross wages from main 
employment, other income from main employment, gross income from secondary employment, 
and income from occasional work. Income from occasional work is taxed under a separate tax 
scheme (15%) if the amount is lower than 5,000 CZK per month. Taxable income also comprises 
gross profit/loss from entrepreneurial activity and honoraria (available in net terms, taxable under 
a separate tax scheme if less than 3,000 CZK per month). Pensions are subject to income tax if the 
yearly amount is greater than 162,000 CZK. Finally, taxable income also includes income from 
rents received and from the occasional sale of agricultural products from own production, while 
capital income and income from pensions and life insurance are taxed under a separate tax 
scheme. Other income variables are heterogeneous, making it impossible to distinguish particular 
income sources. 
In some cases, gross income should be determined from net values for the purposes of personal 
income taxation: 
•  Gross conversion of income from main employment where reported in net terms (the 
CZSO has converted all net items into gross terms, but net items are still available in 
the dataset). 
•  Gross conversion of other (capital, rental) incomes, which are all reported in net terms. 
For the purposes of income taxation, costs should be deducted. As these are not 
reported, they could be replaced by statutory costs: 20% of gross rental income and 
50% of gross revenues from the occasional sale of own agricultural products. 
•  Gross conversion of pensions, which are in net terms where appropriate (for yearly 
pensions greater than 162,000 CZK). 
•  Gross conversion of income from entrepreneurial activity that is reported net of 
contributions (which are partly paid voluntarily by entrepreneurs). We assume that 
entrepreneurs pay all contributions, including those paid voluntarily. 
  
Social and health insurance contributions are deducted from income from main and secondary 
employment and from entrepreneurial income. For the purposes of calculating tax exemptions and 
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should be determined based on the information in the dataset. Regular income tax is determined, 
while separate income tax is calculated based on incomes taxable under the separate tax scheme.
19 
We simulate the following tax allowances: personal, spouse, disability (based on receiving full or 
part invalidity pension) and student. Other allowances or exemptions cannot be simulated. 
Unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and pensions are all available in the dataset, but cannot 
be simulated. Unemployment benefits may only be simulated for persons with information on 
income from work. 
Before simulating benefits based on income tests, we have to determine the amounts of the MLS 
based on household composition. Information on the age and labour market status of children 
allows us to distinguish between dependent children within households for the purposes of income 
tests. 
We simulate the following means-tested benefits: child benefit, social supplement, housing 
benefit and social assistance benefit. Regarding the social supplement, we are able to simulate 
increased amounts of the benefit for lone parents only. Increased amounts reflecting the health 
status of children cannot be simulated as there is no such information in the dataset. 
The following benefits cannot be simulated but are available in the dataset: parental allowance, 
foster care benefit, birth grant, funeral grant and social care benefit. 
5.2 Data Ageing 
Mikrocenzus contains 2002 data, while the main reference year for the microsimulations is 2006. 
All income data which are not simulated should be adjusted accordingly. The main reference data 
for adjusting income variables is the AEIS dataset on average wages of employees, while for other 
items in the dataset either administrative data or inflation rates have been used. 
•  Work income, sickness benefits and unemployment benefits 
We adjust gross income from dependent work using the AEIS data on average wages across 
occupations and gender. The same data source is used for ageing income from entrepreneurial 
activity, as no other suitable datasets exist in this case. We use economy-wide AEIS statistics 
on average wages for ageing sickness and unemployment benefits, as these benefits depend on 
the level of previous income. Unemployment benefit is provided for a period of six months 
based on the net income from previous work. In this case, the period of benefit collection is 
not distant from the previous work activity, so the proposed ageing technique is appropriate. 
However, the technique could potentially deliver misleading results for sickness benefits in 
the case of long-term illnesses. Fortunately, this is not confirmed by the evidence. The 
average duration of illnesses was 35 calendar days in 2006 (see Table 3). Although new 
notified cases of illnesses are high, their duration is mostly short, suggesting that the proposed 
technique for ageing sickness benefits is appropriate. 
 
•  Pensions, non-tested and other social income 
Pensions are aged to the reference year using administrative data from the Czech Social 
Security Administration on average pensions across pension types. Other non-tested benefits 
are adjusted using actual parameters or the inflation rates published by the CZSO. 
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•  Other income 
Some capital and other non-work income depends on interest rates, while ageing in the case of 
other items is difficult. Since the other income categories are heterogeneous in Mikrocenzus 
2002, we use the inflation rate as a parameter for ageing. 
 
Table 3: Incapacity for Work due to Disease or Injury 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
New notified cases of incapacity 
for work per 100 sickness 
insured persons
86.2 80.4 81.7 61.6 68.2 60.2
Average duration of 1 case of 
incapacity for work (calendar 
days)
28.6 30.8 30.5 34.8 32.8 35.3
Average percentage of 
incapacity for work 6.7 6.8 6.8 5.9 6.1 5.8
 
Source: Czech Statistical Office. 
Table 4: Key Indicators 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 vs. 2002
GDP (%, y-o-y, real terms) 2.5 1.9 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.1 21.5
Inflation rate (%, end-of-period) 4.7 1.8 0.1 2.8 1.9 2.5 7.5
Average monthly nominal wages (%, y-o-y) 8.7 7.3 6.6 6.6 5.2 6.5 27.4
Average monthly real wages (%, y-o-y) 3.8 5.4 6.5 3.7 3.3 3.8 18.5
Number of employees (%, y-o-y) 0.3 -0.8 -2.0 -0.2 2.2 1.2 1.1
ILO unemployment rate (%) 8.1 7.3 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.1 -0.7**
ILO long-term unemployment rate (%)* 4.2 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.3 3.9 5.1**
Registered unemployment rate (%) 8.3 8.9 9.7 10.0 9.5 8.6 -1.6**  
Source: Czech Statistical Office, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, own calculations. 
Note: 
* Persons unemployed more than 12 months, 
** Cumulative change in the number of unemployed 
persons in percent. 
 
The pure income data ageing approach assumes that labour market participation in the reference 
period is the same as in the survey period. In other words, the model is static in nature. Due to 
changes in the economy and on the labour market, we have to discuss changes in labour market 
participation and how these changes would affect the results. The effect may be more pronounced 
when the reference period is far from the survey date, as is 2006 versus 2002 in this case.  
Table 4 shows the key macroeconomic indicators between 2001 and 2006. GDP growth rates in 
constant prices indicate that in 2002 the economy reached the bottom of a moderate economic 
slowdown (a 1.9% year-on-year change, as compared to 2.5% in 2001 and 6.1% in 2006). The 
rate of economic growth accelerated between 2002 and 2006, while the cumulative growth of the 
number of employees was only 1.1% and the number of job seekers decreased by 0.7% (ILO 
definition) or 1.6% (administrative data). Although the number of employed and unemployed is 
almost the same in 2006 as in 2002, the composition of the employed and unemployed in terms of 
skills and economic branches has changed to some extent. In particular, the number of long-term 
unemployed increased by 5.1% between 2002 and 2006. Although the composition of employed 
and unemployed persons changed to some extent between 2002 and 2006, we believe that 
applying appropriate data ageing techniques lead to results comparable to those obtained using a 
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5.3 Model Description 
Using the information provided in Section 3, we write tax-benefit equations. For appropriate 
parameters, the equations allow us to calculate personal income tax for any individual with 
taxable income. Using the information on household composition, we are able to determine the 
benefits for which the household is eligible and the resulting net household income. 
Applying the tax-benefit equations to prototypal households, we calculate net replacement rates 
by simulating transitions between the state of employment and unemployment either with or 
without unemployment benefits. When simulating transitions between the labour market states, 
we assume that the gross income of the other adult partner in the household, if there is any, is the 
same, while the net income of that person is recalculated. Net household income and net 
replacement rates are simulated for prototypal households using parameters from 1996, 2006 and 
2007.
20
We define the following household types: single individuals, households with a non-working 
partner and households with a working partner earning either half, two thirds or the full economy-
wide average wage. Another five categories are defined in the same way, considering the presence 
of two children aged 6 and 4 in the household. In order to investigate the effect of parental 
allowance, which is provided for caring for children younger than 4, we consider a further five 
household types with two children aged 4 and 2 as an alternative. 
In the next step we match the tax-benefit equations with the dataset. The model loads parameters 
for 2002 and converts net income items in the dataset into gross values. As we use 2006 as the 
reference year, the model updates the income variables to 2006 (see subsection 5.2). In the next 
step, the model determines spouses and children within households for the purposes of simulating 
income taxes and benefit eligibility tests. The minimum subsistence amount is also determined for 
every household at this stage. Then the model calculates income tax, social security contributions 
and social benefits. The instruments are simulated using the data aged to 2006 and the 2006 
parameters. For the purposes of analysing the effects of the reform introduced in 2007, we apply 
the 2007 parameters using the 2006 data. Regarding housing benefit, we assume a household 
living in a small town, while for social assistance we assume that all the unemployed are actively 
seeking a job, so that social assistance benefits top up their net household income to the MLS 
amount.
21
Using the model, we simulate net replacement rates for household heads and partners in the 
dataset. We do not consider students and persons receiving full invalidity or old-age pension. 
Employed persons are defined as those with employment for at least 3 months during the year and 
without any unemployment benefits. The short-term unemployed are those receiving 
unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the long-term unemployed are defined as persons 
without any employment and without unemployment benefits. Net replacement rates are thus 
calculated for employed persons transiting to unemployment either with or without 
unemployment benefits. For unemployed persons in the dataset, we do not estimate their potential 
 
20 Housing benefit provided in 2007 is considered to be a part of social assistance. 
21 While job search activity is not reported in the dataset, we label all non-working individuals as unemployed. 
By ILO definition, an unemployed individual is seeking a job and is able to start working in two weeks. 26   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
entry wage, but instead assume their transitions into employment with earnings equal to either two 
thirds or half of the economy-wide average wage. 
Table A3 in the Appendix shows the net household income and summary statistics in 2002. The 
sample contains 8,118 individuals with an average net household income of 21,310 CZK. Most 
persons are from households with a working spouse – specifically 42% with children and 24% 
without children. These household types also have the highest net household income. On the other 
hand, 5.5% of individuals are without a partner and with children, with a net household income of 
11,044 CZK. Out of the total number of individuals, 7,019 are employed and 1,099 are without 
employment. 
5.4 Other Modelling Issues 
The microsimulation model is based on household level data, so persons living in institutions – 
primarily foreign workers – are not covered. In the Czech Republic, the number of persons living 
in institutions may be large by international comparison. The CZSO estimates, for example, that 
the number of foreign workers living in institutions (hostels) is around 70,000. However, 
foreigners are often not eligible for social benefits. The model is therefore targeted at the native 
population, mostly living in households. Other issues which we discuss here are the role of 
income from the informal economy and non-take-up of benefits. 
The microsimulation model does not capture income from the informal economy. In particular, 
income from unofficial work is not included in net household income, which is tested for the 
purposes of benefit eligibility. Households have incentives to declare low net household income in 
order to be eligible for social benefits. On the other hand, income from informal work leads to 
higher net replacement rates. 
Jurajda and Zubricky (2005) show that income from unofficial work significantly reduces the job-
seeking incentives for unemployed persons. In particular, when taking up an official job, net 
replacement rates may be greater than 100%, since entering into the official employment figures 
results not only in the loss of some social support, but also in the loss of any income from 
unofficial work. Jurajda and Zubricky demonstrate how much space (or “incentive”) there is in 
the Czech system of taxes and benefits for unofficial work activities. The space is represented as 
the spread between the minimum official take-home wage and the total labour cost borne by 
employers. The lower bound (official net wage) makes the unemployed person indifferent 
between working officially and not working, while the upper bound (total labour costs borne by 
the employer) makes the employer indifferent between employing the person officially and not 
employing. The space between the bounds represents the range of unofficial wages for which both 
the unemployed person and the employer are better off. The results for several family types and 
potential wage positions indicate that the spread is high. In particular, total labour costs are more 
than twice the minimum official net wage. This result is particularly due to high social security 
contributions paid by employees and employers.  
Evidence on high disincentives to job-seeking of persons with income from unofficial work can 
also be found in Jahoda (2004). Using examples of workers with different entry wages for a given 
family type, Jahoda estimates the amount of unofficial income and the corresponding marginal 
effective tax rates. These rates are all greater than 100%, even in the case of workers whose 
earnings equal the average wage. It can therefore be concluded that income from unofficial work Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   27 
 
                                                          
is a significant factor that should be borne in mind when drawing lessons from microsimulations 
on the issue of work incentives. 
The non-take-up of benefits is another effect which is not captured by our microsimulations. It 
reduces net replacement rates, thus increasing work incentives. In particular, we assume that all 
individuals and households pay all taxes that they are required to, and claim all benefits for which 
they are eligible.
22
The only existing study on this issue focusing on the Czech Republic is probably Mareš (2001). 
He first simulates how many households were eligible for specific benefits in 1996 using 
Mikrocenzus 1996, and then compares these potential claims with administrative data from the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The results reveal that child benefits are collected by 92% 
of households of those eligible, while the share is 63% in the case of the social supplement and 
only 40% for housing benefit. This suggests that non-take-up may be more significant for benefits 
targeted at poor households with children, in line with similar results for other European 
countries. Based on opinion polls surveyed in 1999, Mareš draws direct information on 
experience with collecting benefits. The results show that non-take-up is in general less 
widespread than in other EU countries. This is probably due to the fact that the eligibility criteria 
for benefits are not as strict as in the EU (in 2000) and that benefit collection is not such a stigma 
as elsewhere in the EU. The extent of non-take-up is between 10% and 30% in terms of persons 
eligible for benefits. The main determinants of non-take-up include socio-demographic 
characteristics and social background. In particular, persons not claiming some benefits either 
have no incentive for claiming, are not informed, or are stigmatised. These effects may be largely 
associated with the complexity of the tax and benefit system, coupled with poor administration of 
benefits. Given that non-take-up of benefits is less widespread than in other countries, we believe 
that our results are little affected by neglecting non-take-up of benefits. 
6. Results 
Before analysing distributions of net replacement rates using micro-data, we simulate net 
household income and net replacement rates for typical households. While we describe the main 
changes between 1996 and 2006, we also compare the results with 2007. 
6.1 Net Replacement Rates for Household Types 
The profiles of net replacement rates in 1996, 2006 and 2007 are illustrated in Figure A1 and 
Figure A2. For households without children and transitions between employment and short-term 
unemployment (the left-hand panel in Figure A1), net replacement rates are in general lower in 
2006 than in 1996 except for entry wages greater than the average wage, i.e. exceeding 100 on the 
horizontal axis.
23 The rates decreased further in 2007 for very low entry wages and single 
individuals or households with an idle partner. On the other hand, the replacement rates increased 
in 2007 for households with an idle partner for an entry wage between 50% and 80%, and for 
single individuals with an entry wage around 40% of the average wage. Net replacement rates are 
 
22 Contrary to non-take-up of benefits, not-entitled taking of benefits increases net replacement rates. This is not 
discussed here due to lack of any evidence. 
23 This is due to higher unemployment benefits in 2006 relative to 1996. While the maximum unemployment 
benefit was 3,990 CZK in 1996, it had increased to 11,050 CZK in 2006 and further to 11,722 CZK in 2007. 28   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
also lower in 2006 and further in 2007 for transitions into long-term unemployment and low entry 
wages in the case of single individuals and households with a non-working partner (the right-hand 
panel in Figure A1). Slightly higher net replacement rates are surprisingly observed in 2007 at low 
entry wages of individuals from households where the partner earns half of the average wage. 
Figure A2 shows net replacement rates for households with two children aged 6 and 4. For 
transitions between employment and short-term unemployment (the left-hand panel), the 
replacement rates are significantly lower in 2006 than in 1996 for households without a partner or 
with an idle partner. On the other hand, the rates are higher in 2006 for individuals with a higher 
entry wage from households where the partner earns at least two thirds of the average wage. In 
2007, the rates decreased further for entry wages lower than 50% or 60% of the average wage and 
for households without a partner or with an idle partner, and increased otherwise. For transitions 
between employment and long-term unemployment (the right-hand panel in Figure A2), the rates 
are in general lower in 2006 compared to 1996 and further in 2007 except for households with a 
working partner, for which the rates increased. As we will see later, this reflects changes in the 
social assistance scheme, which is more generous to households with some work income in 2007, 
while social assistance is reduced for households without any work income. 
In Figure A3 the net replacement rates are, as an alternative, simulated for households with two 
children aged 4 and 2 in order to examine how the rise in the amount of parental allowance as of 
January 2007 affects the results. While the profiles of net replacement rates are similar to those 
for households with children aged 6 and 4 in Figure A2, the replacement rates are higher in 2007 
than in 2006 particularly for single parents, if we consider transitions between employment and 
long-term unemployment. As the parental allowance is not means-tested, its changes have rather 
little effect on replacement rates. We will explore the effect of parental allowance on work 
incentives later. 
Overall, the evidence provided in Figures A1, A2 and A3 indicates that net replacement rates 
changed marginally between 1996 and 2006 or 2007 for households that are better off in terms of 
their potential wage or have a partner earning at least two thirds of the average wage, except for 
the short-term unemployed with an entry wage greater than 120% of the average wage, who 
receive a higher unemployment benefit in 2006 and 2007 relative to 1996. For low-income 
households, the net replacement rates mostly decreased until 2006 and 2007. 
The net replacement rates from Figures A1 to A3 are also expressed in Table A4, which shows 
wage levels in per cent of the average wage for which the net replacement rate is 75% or 90%. 
Simulations are shown for selected household types and for transitions between employment and 
short-term unemployment (upper panel) and between employment and long-term unemployment 
(lower panel). For the short-term unemployed with an NRR equal to 75% in 1996, the entry wage 
was 42% of the average wage for single individuals, while it was higher if a partner was present in 
the household, reaching 77% if the partner did not work or 104% of the average wage if the 
partner earned the average wage. The net replacement rates are all higher if there are children in 
the household, as documented in the subsequent rows in Table A4. These results indicate that 
short-term unemployed individuals from households with a partner or/and children face higher 
disincentives to work as compared to single individuals. The disincentives diminished to some 
extent until 2006, except for households with children where the other partner earns at least two 
thirds of the average wage. In particular, the entry wage increased to 151% of the average wage Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   29 
 
                                                          
for persons with a partner earning the average wage and with two children aged 6 and 4, or to 
161% if the children are aged 4 and 2. The results also suggest that in 2007 the entry wages 
increased further for households with children and an NRR equal to 75%. For very high net 
replacement rates reaching 90%, the entry wage is higher in 2006 and further in 2007 for 
households with children where the partner earns the average wage. 
The lower panel of Table A4 shows entry wages for transitions between employment and long-
term unemployment, i.e. the state without work and without unemployment benefits. While work 
incentives were lower in 1996 for the short-term unemployed with a working partner, for the long-
term unemployed facing an NRR equal to 75% the incentives are lower when the partner is idle. 
For this household type in 1996, the entry wage reached 77% of the average wage for childless 
households and 107% for households with two children aged 6 and 4, or 78% if the children were 
aged 4 and 2. While entry wages decreased until 2006 in most cases, they are also lower in 2007 
except for households with a working partner. 
While we find high net replacement rates for individuals from households with a working partner, 
these individuals conversely have the lowest unemployment rates and experience shorter 
unemployment spells in comparison with individuals from other household types, as we 
documented in Section 2. On the other hand, employment prospects are the least favourable for 
single parents, facing the highest unemployment rate and longer unemployment spells. This 
suggests that the link between net replacement rates and labour market flows and stocks is not 
straightforward if one examines variation in net replacement rates across household types. Instead, 
the effect of net replacement rates on labour market behaviour should be further analysed for 
particular household types. Our results indicate that labour market flows depend on household 
composition, particularly the presence of a partner and her or his labour market status and 
children, a factor neglected in previous studies. 
The overall trend towards decreasing net replacement rates between 1996 and 2006 is primarily 
due to the fact that the average wage increased faster than the amount of benefits. The average 
wage in the economy increased by 106%, while the amounts of the minimum subsistence amount, 
which determine the level of means-tested benefits, rose by 66% for single individuals, by 57% 
for a couple without children, and by 51% for a couple with two children aged 6 and 4. The 
amounts of social benefits thus decreased between 1996 and 2006 relative to the average wage. In 
addition, social benefits are reduced for married couples with children in 2006 as a consequence 
of joint income taxation, which increases the net household income relevant for income tests so 




24 Net replacement rates are not in principle comparable across individuals with different work intensities. In the 
Czech Republic, most workers work around 40 hours per week. In particular, an inspection of the Mikrocenzus 
2002 dataset reveals that 78% of employees worked between 38 and 45 hours per week in 2002, indicating that 
net replacement rates are comparable. This also suggests that the incidence of very low wages may be negligible 
due to the minimum wage threshold. The ratio of the full-time minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 
38% in 2006. This should be considered when interpreting the results. 30   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
6.2 Contribution of Benefits to Net Replacement Rates in 2006 and 2007 
We explore factors driving changes in net replacement rates between 2006 and 2007 by 
decomposing net replacement rates into the contributions of net work income and particular 
benefits. The net replacement rates for transitions between employment and short-term 
unemployment are illustrated in Figure A4 and Figure A5. For childless households (Figure A4), 
social assistance is the main factor determining the NRR for low wage earners among single 
individuals and households with idle partners. While the contribution of social assistance 
decreased in 2007 relative to 2006, the contribution of housing benefit saw an increase for the 
same household types. On the other hand, the amount of unemployment benefit has the main role 
in determining net replacement rates for all the household types. While the same can be said for 
households with children (Figure A5), housing benefit is primarily responsible for rising net 
replacement rates for single parents and for households with a non-working partner and children 
in 2007. The net replacement rates of other households are driven by the work income of the other 
partner. 
For transitions between employment and long-term unemployment, where unemployment benefit 
is not provided, net replacement rates are driven primarily by social assistance in the case of 
single individuals and households with an idle partner, or by the work income of the other partner, 
if there is any (Figure A6). While the same is observed for households with children (Figure A7), 
the net replacement rates are also affected by child benefit, social supplement and housing benefit. 
For households with children and either without a partner or with an idle partner, the contribution 
of housing benefit increased in 2007, compensating for the reduction in social assistance. 
6.3 Budget Constraints in 2007 relative to 2006 
Net replacement rates capture relative changes in net household income in the state without and 
with employment. In order to examine how the reform in 2007 affects net household income in 
both employment and unemployment, we investigate the changes in the contributions of taxes and 
particular social benefits to net household income in 2007 relative to 2006 in Figures A8 to A13. 
While the left-hand panels show the changes in contributions to net household income in CZK for 
employed individuals, the middle panels concern the short-term unemployed with unemployment 
benefits, and the right-hand panels are for the long-term unemployed, who are not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. 
Among childless households (Figures A8 and A9), employed low wage earners living alone or 
with a non-working partner see a mild increase in their net household income due to higher 
housing benefit and social assistance, except for the lowest wages, where the social assistance is 
reduced. Social assistance benefits are affected by two factors in 2007. While the lower MLS in 
2007 leads to a lower amount of social assistance benefits, the benefits are conversely increased 
by the introduction of reduction coefficients into the eligibility test for social assistance in 2007 
(see Section 3.3). This favours households with some work income. The increase in net income is 
hence about 1,600 CZK per month for individuals earning about 40% of the average wage from 
households with an idle partner (left-hand bottom panel in Figure A8). The peak moves to 80% of 
the potential entry wage for the short-term unemployed from the same household category 
(middle bottom panel in Figure A8). On the other hand, the short-term unemployed with a high 
entry wage benefit from the rise in the maximum amount of unemployment benefit in 2007. 
Finally, long-term unemployed persons living alone or with an idle partner are worse off in 2007 Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   31 
 
(right-hand panels in Figure A8). The significant reduction in social assistance due to the lower 
MLS is not fully compensated by increasing housing benefit. 
Childless households with a working partner see no change in their net household income in 2007 
relative to 2006, except for the short-term unemployed receiving unemployment benefits with 
very high potential earnings and for the long-term unemployed whose partner earns half of the 
average wage (Figure A9). The latter category benefits from the introduction of reduction 
coefficients into the income test for social assistance in 2007, leading to higher social assistance 
benefits for households with a working partner relative to households where the partner has no 
work income.  
The reform of benefits introduced in 2007 brought significant changes to the net income of 
households with children, as documented in Figures A10 and A11. While the overall patterns are 
similar to those of households without children, households with children receive substantially 
higher housing benefit and also a higher social supplement. In particular, employed individuals 
either without or with a partner who does not work have a higher net household income if they 
earn up to 100% or 120% of the average wage (left-hand panel in Figure A10). On the other hand, 
all the short-term unemployed receive more in 2007 due to higher housing benefits, except for 
very low potential entry wages. Furthermore, the long-term unemployed are worse off in 2007 if 
there is no partner in the household, or have the same net income if they have an idle partner. 
They do not benefit from the increased housing benefit, because of a significant drop in social 
assistance due to the lower MLS in 2007 (right-hand panels in Figure A10). On the contrary, 
long-term unemployed individuals face higher net household income if there is a working partner 
in the household (right-hand panels in Figure A11). Again, the reduction coefficients implemented 
in the eligibility test for social assistance benefits do not penalise households with work income as 
compared to households where no one works. A higher net income due to social assistance is also 
observed in 2007 for employed individuals living with children and a working partner if their 
potential wage is low (left-hand panel in Figure A11). Finally, short-term unemployed individuals 
also have a higher net income, mostly due to higher social assistance, regardless of their potential 
entry wage, except for those whose partner earns the average wage (middle panels in Figure A11). 
Households with children also see a higher social supplement in 2007, while various positive and 
negative peaks in net household income are observed due to shifts in the eligibility criteria for 
child benefits. 
The contributions of taxes and benefits to net household income are simulated in Figures A10 and 
A11 for households with two children aged 6 and 4. In order to examine how the significant rise 
in the amount of parental allowance affects the results, Figures A12 and A13 show the changes in 
contributions for households with two children aged 4 and 2. As parental allowance is not means-
tested, all household types benefit from the increased parental allowance regardless of the labour 
market status of the person in question. However, households where there is no partner or an idle 
partner face reductions in other benefits, primarily in social supplement and social assistance, 
while households with a working partner face mild reductions in child benefit and social 
supplement. The overall message from this comparison is that while the parental allowance is 
higher for all, some less well off households lose by reductions in other means-tested benefits. 32   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
6.4 Determinants of Net Replacement Rates 
The results obtained for typical households suggest that net replacement rates are in general 
higher for households with children and also if there is a partner in the household. Applying the 
tax-benefit equations to the micro-dataset, we are able to assess the determinants of net 
replacement rates among employed and unemployed individuals and to gain insights into how net 
replacement rates are distributed. Table A5 presents estimates of the NRR equations. While the 
first four columns are for potential transitions of employed individuals into short-term and long-
term unemployment, the other four columns show results for unemployed individuals, assuming 
their transitions into employment with potential earnings equal to two thirds or half of the average 
wage. 
The results suggest that for transitions between employment and short-term unemployment, the 
average net replacement rate is 0.72 in 2006 (column 1). While the NRR is on average lower for 
transitions into long-term unemployment (column 3), the average replacement rates are also high 
for unemployed individuals (columns 5 and 7). This suggests that while employed individuals are 
prone to experience repeated spells of short-term unemployment, unemployment traps may also 
be significant for unemployed individuals. As the other columns in Table A5 indicate, the 
presence of children is a significant factor increasing net replacement rates for both employed and 
unemployed individuals in 2006 (types 4 to 6 relative to types 1 to 3), as is the presence of a 
partner in the household (types 3 and 6 relative to types 1 and 4).  
The average net replacement rates are all significantly higher in 2007, as documented in columns 
1, 3 and 5 in Table A5, indicating an even higher risk of being locked in an unemployment trap in 
2007. The risk is particularly high for potential transitions of employed individuals into short-term 
unemployment from households with children, as column 2 suggests (types 4 to 6). For potential 
transitions of employed individuals into long-term unemployment (column 4), the net replacement 
rates are lower in 2007 particularly for single parents, reflecting the reduction in social assistance 
for households without work income. On the other hand, the presence of a working partner 
increases net replacement rates in 2007, due to higher social assistance benefits for households 
with work income, and thus the risk of being locked in a long-term unemployment trap. 
Individuals without employment in the sample also face higher net replacement rates in 2007 
relative to 2006 if we consider their potential transitions into employment with earnings equal to 
two thirds of the average wage (column 5 in Table A5). While for households with children with 
no work income the replacement rates are lower in 2007, the rates are significantly higher for 
households with a working partner (column 8). This reflects the desirable effect of the reform of 
the social assistance scheme reducing the support for households with children without any work 
income and rewarding households with some work income. On the other hand, the reform 
increases the risk of unemployment traps for both employed and unemployed individuals from 
households with children and with a working partner. 
6.5 Incidence of High Net Replacement Rates 
Exploring net replacement rates for typical households, we show how household composition and 
particular types of benefits affect net household income and net replacement rates. While Table 
A5 shows which factors significantly affect net replacement rates, in what follows we analyse the 
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The upper panel in Table A6 shows the share of employed individuals for whom the net 
replacement rate is higher than 70%, 80% and 90% if we consider their potential transitions into 
short-term unemployment, receiving unemployment benefits. In 2006, 31% of employed persons 
would face a net replacement rate higher than 80%, while 6% of employed persons face a very 
high NRR of 90% or higher. This indicates a significant disincentive to avoid short spells of 
unemployment. As the other rows in Table A6 suggest, the presence of a working partner or 
children is associated with high net replacement rates. The changes introduced in 2007 do not 
reduce the incidence of high net replacement rates. In particular, the share of all employed 
individuals facing an NRR greater than 80% increases to 34% in 2007, or to 7% for NRRs greater 
than 90%. The share of employed individuals facing a high NRR is in general higher in 2007 for 
households with children. The incidence of an NRR higher than 80% increases from 9% to 20%  
for single parents, or from 9% to 21% for households with children where the partner does not 
work.  
While the incidence of short-term unemployment traps is significant in 2006 and 2007, the risk of 
long-term unemployment traps for employed persons is much lower (the lower panel in Table 
A6). In particular, 6% of employed persons would face an NRR greater than 80% in 2006, while 
2% would face an NRR greater than 90%. The incidence of high NRRs increases moderately 
between 2006 and 2007. In line with the coefficient estimates in column 4 in Table A5, the 
incidence decreases for single parents, while it increases significantly for households with 
children and a working partner. 
Table A7 presents the share of unemployed individuals who would face a high NRR when finding 
a job at two thirds (the upper panel) or half (the lower panel) of the average wage. While 12% of 
unemployed persons would face an NRR greater than 80% when accepting a job at two thirds of 
the average wage, the incidence increases to 16%  in 2007. Again, the incidence of a high NRR is 
greater for households with a partner or with children. Considering transitions into employment at 
half of the average wage, the share of individuals facing an NRR greater than 80% decreases from 
50% to 19% for households with a non-working partner, while it increases from 44% to 58% for 
households with children and a working partner. This is in line with the last column in Table A5, 
which provides on average a significantly lower NRR estimate for households with children and a 
non-working partner in 2007, and a higher estimate if the partner works. 
6.6 Budgetary Impacts 
The microsimulation model allows us to aggregate income tax and social benefits for all 
individuals and households. Table A8 shows the predictions for 2002, 2006 and 2007. While 
income tax yields 94.0 billion CZK in 2002, in 2006 the total tax payments amount to 97.1 billion 
CZK, while 3.8 billion CZK is paid out as tax bonuses.
25 In 2007, the income tax rule is 
unchanged, so the aggregate tax is the same as in 2006.
26 Among social benefits, the greatest 
amounts are paid out in the form of child benefit, parental allowance, social assistance and 
housing benefit. In 2007, total benefit outlays increase by as much as 14.7 billion CZK. The 
expenditures on child benefit and social supplement do not change significantly, while the 
 
25 Joint income taxation was introduced for married couples with at least one child in 2006, while couples were 
allowed to fill in a joint income tax return for 2005. Considering individual taxation, aggregate personal income 
tax would be 102.3 billion CZK in 2006. 
26 The results in 2007 are calculated by applying the 2007 parameters to the 2006 data. 34   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
                                                          
parental allowance costs 12.5 billion CZK more than in 2006, and housing benefit 5.8 billion CZK 
more relative to 2006. On the other hand, the expenditures on social assistance drop by 3.7 billion 
CZK. As we have seen, the reform of social assistance reduces social assistance for households 
without any work income. On the other hand, the housing benefit scheme is not optimally 
designed in 2007, as it distorts work incentives, particularly for single parents and for households 
with children and a non-working partner. While parental allowance is substantially increased for 
all eligible households, less well off households lose other means-tested benefits. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate net replacement rates between net non-work and work income and 
associate high levels of these rates with work disincentives.
27 We find high net replacement rates 
in 1996 for households with children and a working partner, particularly for transitions between 
employment and short-term unemployment. In general, the replacement rates decreased 
moderately until 2006 primarily because wages rose faster than social benefits, but the incidence 
of high replacement rates remains high. In particular, about a third of all employed individuals 
have a low incentive to avoid short spells of unemployment with the unemployment benefits 
provided, while unemployment traps are also widespread among the unemployed. The incidence 
of unemployment traps increased further in 2007 despite the reform of benefits, particularly for 
individuals from households with children and with a working partner.
28
We compare the evidence on the incidence of high net replacement rates of individuals from 
selected household types with specific unemployment rates and aggregate labour market flows 
calculated from the individual-level Labour Force Survey. We show that unemployment rates and 
flows from unemployment are strongly related to household composition, particularly to the 
presence of a partner and her or his labour supply and also to children in the household, a factor 
neglected in previous studies. We find that single parents have the highest specific unemployment 
rates, while they also experience long spells of unemployment in comparison with individuals 
from other household types. Single parents, on the other hand, face moderate levels of net 
replacement rates. Furthermore, while individuals from households with a working partner have 
the highest net replacement rates, as their work income does not add much to the net household 
income, these individuals have the lowest unemployment rates and experience short 
unemployment spells in comparison with individuals from other household types. This suggests 
that labour supply is often a joint decision within couples, indicating that work habits due to 
household composition and labour market attachment also affect labour market behaviour. While 
previous studies examined labour market flows versus net replacement rates using the variation in 
net replacement rates across household types, further research should investigate the flows and 
replacement rates for particular household types. 
We explore which instruments are responsible for high net replacement rates, distorting work 
incentives. While unemployment benefit contributes to net replacement rates for the short-term 
unemployed, the net replacement rates of low wage earners are significantly affected by social 
 
27 We associate significant work disincentives with net replacement rates higher than 80%. We focus on the 
pecuniary motivation for job search, but other factors, such as job search monitoring by the authorities providing 
social benefits, are also important. 
28 In this paper we do not consider fixed costs of work related, for example, to commuting and child care. These 
costs would in principle lead to even higher net replacement rates. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   35 
 
assistance, while housing benefit is an important source of income for poor households with 
children. We show that the changes to the benefit rules introduced in 2007 adversely affect the 
work incentives emanating from the combined effect of taxes and benefits. While social assistance 
is in general less generous, diminishing the incidence of high net replacement rates for low wage 
earners from households with a non-working partner, the reform gives preferential treatment to 
households with some work income by increasing the amount of social assistance benefits. This 
further increases the incidence of high net replacement rates among poor households with a 
working partner. We also find that the housing benefit scheme, which was overhauled to reflect 
housing costs, increases net replacement rates, distorting work incentives, particularly among 
households with children. Finally, parental allowance was substantially increased in 2007. As this 
benefit is not means-tested, it raises the income of all households with at least one child younger 
than 4, but less well off households lose other means-tested benefits. While net replacement rates 
are little affected by the rise in parental allowance, the upsurge in household income may lock 
individuals into their current labour market states, increasing the loss of human capital among 
non-working parents. 
Further changes to taxes and benefits are desirable in order to diminish the distortions of non-
work income on work incentives and to ensure fiscal sustainability. As such reforms are often 
costly for the state budget, they should be ‘ex-ante’ examined with regard to how they may affect 
the labour market behaviour of particular population groups. Further research should analyse how 
housing benefit distorts work incentives in regions, as the benefit is linked to local costs of living. 
Finally, the microsimulation model should be matched with individual-level data containing 
labour market flows with the aim of finding direct evidence on the effects of non-work income 
and net replacement rates on labour market behaviour, focusing on specific household types. 
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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
Average Gross Earnings Information System (AEIS) 
Informační systém o průměrném výdělku 
Czech Social Security Administration   Česká správa sociálního zabezpečení 
Czech Statistical Office (CZSO)    Český statistický úřad 
Minimum living standard (MLS)    Životní minimum 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs   Ministerstvo práce a sociálních věcí 
I n c o m e   t a x       D a ň z příjmu 
Tax bonus per child        Daňový bonus na dítě 
Consumption  taxes     Spotřební daně 
Value  added  tax     Daň z přidané hodnoty 
Excise  tax      Spotřební daň 
Customs      Cla 
Property  taxes      Majetkové  daně 
Road  tax      Silniční daň 
Real  estate  tax      Daň z pozemku a ze staveb 
Inheritance  tax      Daň dědická 
G i f t   t a x      D a ň darovací 
Real estate transfer tax       Daň z převodu nemovitostí 
Social and health insurance contributions  Příspěvky na sociální a zdravotní pojištění 
Pension insurance contributions      Příspěvky na důchodové pojištění 
Contributions for the state employment policy  Příspěvky na státní politiku 
zaměstnanosti 
Sickness insurance contributions      Příspěvky na nemocenské pojištění 
Public health insurance contributions      Příspěvky na zdravotní pojištění 
Unemployment benefit      Dávka v nezaměstnanosti 
Sickness  benefit     Nemocenská 
P e n s i o n      D ůchod 
Child  benefit      Přídavek na dítě 
Social  supplement     Socialní  příplatek 
Housing  benefit     Příspěvek na bydlení 
Parental  allowance     Rodičovský příspěvek 
Foster  care  benefit     Dávka  pěstounské péče 
Funeral  grant      Pohřebné 
Birth  grant      Porodné 
Social assistance benefit      Dávka sociální potřebnosti, příspěvek na živobytí 
Social care benefit        Dávka sociální péče 
Housing  supplement     Příplatek na bydlení Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   39 
 
Appendix 
Table A1: Incomes, Taxes and Benefits in 2002 
Instrument  Billion CZK   %  Number of 
households paying   
or receiving the 
instrument (%)** 
Wages and salaries  803.9    62.6 
    
 
Net mixed income of entrepreneurs  297.0    17.8 
 
Net disposable income  1271.8     
Health and social insurance       
Employees (compulsory) 89.3    62.1 
Entrepreneurs (compulsory) 20.6     
Entrepreneurs (voluntary) 15.2     
Income tax  113.9    69.6 
Social benefits  303.8    80.5 
Pensions 212.6   45.6 
Sickness benefits 32.7    12.5 
Passive employment policy benefits 6.1    9.6 
State social support  33.7  100.0   
Child benefit 13.4  39.6  31.9 
Social supplement 6.3  18.6  7.1 
Housing benefit 3.0  9.0  6.4 
Commuting benefit* 1.3  3.8  5.6 
Parental allowance 8.0  23.8  8.5 
Allowance for soldiers* 0.01  0.04  0.01 
Foster care benefits 0.4  1.2  0.1 
Birth grant 0.8  2.3  2.5*** 
Funeral grant 0.5  1.6   
Other benefits (provided by municipalities) 11.6    11.6 
Sources: Czech Statistical Office, own calculations. 
Note: ESA 95 data refer to households, except social income, which is by use. 
         * Not provided in 2005. ** Calculations based on Mikrocenzus 2002, *** Birth grant and funeral 
grant. 40   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
Table A2: Identification 
Instrument  Available in the 
dataset* 
Simulated 
(yes/partly/no)  Data requirements if available in the dataset 
Personal income tax  Yes Yes 
Gross earnings, marital status and the 
presence of the spouse, the number of 
dependent children, information on full/partial 
disability. Disability may be assessed according 
to full/part disability pension collection only. 
Some exemptions cannot be simulated. 
Value added tax, 
excise tax, customs  No No  Not  available 
Road tax, real estate 
tax, inheritance tax, 
gift tax, real estate 
transfer tax 
No No  Not  available 




only, not for 
entrepreneurs 
Partly 
Gross earnings. For entrepreneurs, it is 
assumed they pay all contributions, including 
those paid voluntarily. 
Unemployment 
benefit  Yes No  Net earnings (available for persons with a 
record of employment during the survey year) 
Sickness benefit  Yes No  Gross wage (available for persons with a 
record of employment during the survey year) 
Pensions  Yes  No  Available in the dataset 
Child benefit  Yes Yes  Net household income, information on 
dependent children 
Social supplement  Yes Partly 
Net household income, information on 
dependent children (increased amounts cannot 
be simulated, except for lone parents) 
Housing benefit  Yes  Yes  Net household income, household composition 
Parental allowance  Yes No  Information on dependent children (cannot 
simulate increased amounts due to disability) 
Foster care benefit  Yes No  Information on fostered children (cannot be 
distinguished from other dependent children) 
Funeral grant  Yes  No  Information on deceased relatives 
Birth grant  Yes  No  Births (available for the survey year only) 
Social assistance 
benefit  Yes Partly 
Net household income. Irregular assistance 
may be provided depending on disability, 
wealth, the degree of cooperation with the 
social office, etc. 
Social care benefit  Yes No  Benefits provided by municipalities for specific 
purposes 
Note: * All instruments which are available in the dataset are reported at the individual and household 
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Table A3: Net Household Income in CZK and Summary Statistics (2002) 
Partner  Children  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Freq.  % Freq. 
Whole sample         
All  All  21 310  13 667  8 118  4 442 927  100.0 
            
No  No  12 951  12 124  1 051  524 706  11.8 
Non-working  No  17 224  12 239  424  273 327  6.2 
Working  No  23 865  11 839  2 054  1 082 395  24.4 
No  Yes  11 044  5 119  451  246 421  5.5 
Non-working  Yes  15 934  14 145  671  439 362  9.9 
Working  Yes  25 375  13 621  3 467  1 876 716  42.2 
            
Working individuals          
All  All  22 668  13 463  7 019  3 677 504  100.0 
            
No  No  13 665  12 684  966  464 693  12.6 
Non-working  No  18 534  12 883  367  230 087  6.3 
Working  No  24 451  11 080  1 928  979 230  26.6 
No  Yes  12 985  5 203  316  148 818  4.0 
Non-working  Yes  17 964  15 288  576  344 088  9.4 
Working  Yes  26 937  13 006  2 866  1 510 588  41.1 
            
Non-working individuals          
All  All  14 787  12 733  1 099  765 423  100.0 
            
No  No  7 416  2 240  85  60 013  7.8 
Non-working  No  10 249  2 473  57  43 240  5.6 
Working  No  18 308  16 528  126  103 165  13.5 
No  Yes  8 086  3 233  135  97 603  12.8 
Non-working  Yes  8 605  3 186  95  95 274  12.4 
Working  Yes  18 934  14 205  601  366 128  47.8 
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Figure A1: NRRs for Household Types (no children) 
no partner
non-working partner
partner working at 1/2 AW
partner working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Transitions between employment and unemployment with unemployment benefits (left-hand panel) 
and between employment and unemployment without unemployment benefits (right-hand panel). 
Wage in relation to AW in % is on horizontal axis. The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 
26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   43 
 
Figure A2: NRRs for Household Types (two children aged 6 and 4) 
no partner
non-working partner
partner working at 1/2 AW
partner working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Transitions between employment and unemployment with unemployment benefits (left-hand panel) 
and between employment and unemployment without unemployment benefits (right-hand panel). 
Wage in relation to AW in % is on horizontal axis. The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 
26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006. 44   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
Figure A3: NRRs for Household Types (two children aged 4 and 2) 
no partner
non-working partner
partner working at 1/2 AW
partner working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Transitions between employment and unemployment with unemployment benefits (left-hand panel) 
and between employment and unemployment without unemployment benefits (right-hand panel). 
Wage in relation to AW in % is on horizontal axis. The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 
26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006. Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   45 
 
Table A4: Entry Wage in Relation to AW in % for Specific NRRs 
     NRR=75%   NRR=90% 
Partner Children    1996  2006  2007    1996  2006  2007 
E - U(UB)                  
no   no    42  32  34    32  24  18 
non-working no    77  54  66    60  42  21 
working (1/2 AW)  no    87  51  51    31  23  24 
working (2/3 AW)  no    93  67  67    32  23  25 
working (AW)  no    104  101  101    37  27  28 
                  
no   yes (6+4)    71  46  98    50  32  22 
non-working yes  (6+4)    107  64  84    76  47  22 
working (1/2 AW)  yes (6+4)    113  99  113    30  42  63 
working (2/3 AW)  yes (6+4)    111  114  114    53  43  55 
working (AW)  yes (6+4)    108  151  158    54  48  48 
                  
no   yes (4+2)    100  70  64    27  19  22 
non-working yes  (4+2)    94  42  84    50  26  22 
working (1/2 AW)  yes (4+2)    109  110  131    63  37  37 
working (2/3 AW)  yes (4+2)    107  133  155    55  36  40 
working (AW)  yes (4+2)    114  161  177    46  55  62 
E - U(no UB)                  
no   no    42  32  22    32  24  11 
non-working no    77  54  40    60  42  21 
working (1/2 AW)  no    25  24  31    9  8  14 
working (2/3 AW)  no    29  25  25    9  8  9 
working (AW)  no    34  33  33    11  10  10 
                  
no   yes (6+4)    71  46  22    50  32  11 
non-working yes  (6+4)    107  64  40    76  47  22 
working (1/2 AW)  yes (6+4)    54  42  71    24  9  27 
working (2/3 AW)  yes (6+4)    44  52  70    11  23  30 
working (AW)  yes (6+4)    61  56  65    20  22  32 
                  
no   yes (4+2)    44  22  39    26  16  18 
non-working yes  (4+2)    78  42  41    50  26  17 
working (1/2 AW)  yes (4+2)    50  47  54    13  19  22 
working (2/3 AW)  yes (4+2)    60  49  53    19  20  22 
working (AW)  yes (4+2)    61  58  71    20  22  26 
Note: Transitions between employment and unemployment with unemployment benefits (upper panel) 
         and between employment and unemployment without unemployment benefits (lower panel). 
         Children aged 6 and 4 or 4 and 2 as an alternative. The ratio of the minimum to average wage 
         was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006.46   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
Figure A4: Contribution of Benefits to NRRs in 2006 (left) and 2007 (right) 
                  (Transitions into short-term unemployment, no children) 
no partner
non-working partner
partner working at 1/2 AW
partner working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), unemployment benefit (UB), housing benefit (HB) and social 
assistance (SA,  total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 
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Figure A5: Contribution of Benefits to NRRs in 2006 (left) and 2007 (right)        
                  (Transitions into short-term unemployment, two children aged 6 and 4) 
no partner
non-working partner
partner working at 1/2 AW
partner working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social 
supplement (SS), housing benefit (HB) and social assistance (SA, total). The ratio of the minimum to 
average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006. 48   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
Figure A6: Contribution of Benefits to NRRs in 2006 (left) and 2007 (right)       
                  (Transitions into long-term unemployment, no children) 
no partner
non-working partner
partner working at 1/2 AW
partner working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), housing benefit (HB) and social assistance (SA, total). The 







Figure A7: Contribution of Benefits to NRRs in 2006 (left) and 2007 (right)       
                  (Transitions into long-term unemployment, two children aged 6 and 4) 
r working at 1/2 AW
r working at 2/3 AW
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), housing benefit 
(HB) and social assistance (SA, total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 
and 38% in 2006. 
 
 
 Figure A8: Changes in Contributions of Taxes and Benefits to Net Household Income in CZK between 2006 and 2007 in Employment (left), Short-Term 
Unemployment (middle) and Long-Term Unemployment (right) 
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), taxes and social security insurance payments (taxes), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), 









Figure A9: Changes in Contributions of Taxes and Benefits to Net Household Income in CZK between 2006 and 2007 in Employment (left), Short-Term 
Unemployment (middle) and Long-Term Unemployment (right) 
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), taxes and social security insurance payments (taxes), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), 
housing benefit (HB), social assistance (SA) and total change (total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006.  
Figure A10: Changes in Contributions of Taxes and Benefits to Net Household Income in CZK between 2006 and 2007 in Employment (left), Short-
Term Unemployment (middle) and Long-Term Unemployment (right) 
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), taxes and social security insurance payments (taxes), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), 
housing benefit (HB), social assistance (SA) and total change (total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006.  
Figure A11: Changes in Contributions of Taxes and Benefits to the Household Income in CZK between 2006 and 2007 in Employment (left), Short-
Term Unemployment (middle) and Long-Term Unemployment (right) 
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), taxes and social security insurance payments (taxes), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), 
housing benefit (HB), social assistance (SA) and total change (total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006.  
Figure A12: Changes in Contributions of Taxes and Benefits to Net Household Income in CZK between 2006 and 2007 in Employment (left), Short-
Term Unemployment (middle) and Long-Term Unemployment (right) 
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), taxes and social security insurance payments (taxes), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), 
housing benefit (HB), social assistance (SA) and total change (total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006. 
 
  
Figure A13: Changes in Contributions of Taxes and Benefits to Net Household Income in CZK between 2006 and 2007 in Employment (left), Short-
Term Unemployment (middle) and Long-Term unemployment (right) 
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Note: Contribution of work income (work), taxes and social security insurance payments (taxes), unemployment benefit (UB), child benefit (CB), social supplement (SS), 
housing benefit (HB), social assistance (SA) and total change (total). The ratio of the minimum to average wage was 26% in 1996 and 38% in 2006. 56   Kamil Galuščák and Jan Pavel   
 
Table A5: Weighted OLS Regressions of Net Replacement Rates 
  Employed individuals  Unemployed individuals 
  E-U(UB) E-U(noUB)  U-E(2/3AW)  U-E(1/2AW) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
constant 0.723***    0.547***  0.679***   0.757***  
type1   0.520***    0.342***    0.482***    0.618*** 
type2   0.663***    0.449***    0.609***    0.714*** 
type3   0.743***    0.523***    0.692***    0.768*** 
type4   0.672***    0.588***    0.613***    0.689*** 
type5   0.668***    0.550***    0.691***    0.785*** 
type6   0.798***    0.635***    0.731***    0.792*** 
d2007 0.012***    0.010***    0.013**    0.006  
type1*d2007   0.019***    -0.027***   0.003    0.004 
type2*d2007  0.008   0.006   0.002    -0.022 
type3*d2007  0.002   0.013***   0.004    0.004 
type4*d2007   0.041***    -0.067***   0.013    0.001 
type5*d2007   0.035***    0.005   -0.005    -0.040*** 
type6*d2007   0.009***    0.029***    0.024***    0.022*** 
N  14038 14038 14038  14038  2198  2198  2198  2198 
R
2 0.002 0.98 0.001  0.95  0.004 0.99  0.001  0.99 
Note: Transitions into short-term and long-term unemployment and into employment at two thirds and half 
of the average wage. 
         Dummies for children, non-working partner, working partner, family types, year 2007 (d2007) and 
interactions. 
         Type1: single, no children; type2: non-working partner, no children; type3: working partner, no 
children; type 4: single, children; type5: non-working partner, children; type6: working partner, 
children.  *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.     
 
Table A6: Incidence of high NRRs among Employed Persons in per cent (for NRR>70%, 80% 
and 90%) in 2006 and 2007 
   2006    2007 
Partner Children  >70% >80%  >90%    >70%  >80%  >90% 
E->U(UB)             
All All  64  31  6    68  34  7 
              
No No  3 1 1    4  1  0 
Non-working No  37  5  1    42  7  1 
Working No  75  22  1   77  22  1 
No Yes 36  9 4    62  20  2 
Non-working Yes  45  9  3    57  21  1 
Working Yes  87  57  12    89  61  15 
E->U(noUB)              
All All  18  6 2    21  7  2 
              
No No  3 1 1    1  0  0 
Non-working No  5  2  1    4  1  0 
Working No  6  1  0   7  2  0 
No Yes 25  8 3    4  2  1 
Non-working Yes  16  7  3    15  3  1 
Working Yes  32  10  2   41  16  3 
Note: Share of individuals in per cent with NRRs greater than 70, 80 and 90% in 2006 and 2007. Potential 
transitions into short-term unemployment (upper panel) and long-term unemployment (lower panel). Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic   57 
 
Table A7: Incidence of high NRRs among Unemployed Persons in per cent (for NRR>70%, 80% 
and 90%) in 2006 and 2007 
   2006    2007 
Partner  Children >70% >80% >90%    >70% >80% >90% 
U->E(2/3AW)           
All All  47  12  1    54  16  1 
                
No  No  4 0 0    7 0 0 
Non-working  No  6 0 0    12 0 0 
Working No  51  16  2    51  16  2 
No Yes 19  4  0    20  9  0 
Non-working Yes  50  2  0    32  7  0 
Working Yes  65  20  1    82  24  1 
U->E(1/2AW)           
All All  73  36  7    77  39  7 
                
No No  23  12  2    32  16  5 
Non-working No  66  17  0    40  16  0 
Working No  70  40  14    72  41  14 
No Yes 42  9  4    45  13  5 
Non-working Yes  81  50  6    85  19  2 
Working Yes  89  44  8    97  58  8 
Note: Share of individuals in per cent with NRRs greater than 70, 80 and 90% in 2006 and 2007. Potential 
transitions into employment with earnings equal to two thirds (upper panel) and half (lower panel) of 
the average wage. 
 
Table A8: Predicted Aggregate Revenues and Expenditures (billion CZK) 
  2002 2006  2007  2007-2006 
Income tax  94.0  97.1    
(102.3)* 
97.1 0.0 
Tax bonus per child  0.0  3.8    
(1.6)* 
3.8 0.0 
Parental allowance (PA) 11.9  11.9  24.3  12.5 
Child benefit (CB)  12.4 12.6  12.1  -0.4 
Social supplement (SS)  3.4  3.4  3.3  -0.1 
Housing benefit (HB)  6.4  6.4  12.2  5.8 
Social assistance (SA)  7.9  7.9  4.2  -3.7 
Housing supplement (HS) 0.0  0.0  0.7 0.7 
Total benefits  42.0 42.1  56.8  14.7 
Total - tested benefits 30.1  30.3  32.5  2.2 
SA+HS 7.9  7.9  4.9  -3.0 
HB+SA+HS 14.3  14.3  17.1  2.8 
Note: Calculated using the model. 
         * Individual income taxation considered in parentheses. 
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